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DEFYING GRAVITY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF  
STANDARDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL  
PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ATROCITY  
CRIMES  
Matthew H. Charity* 
INTRODUCTION 
The International Criminal Court ("ICC") is now entering its second 
decade of existence.1 As a young institution, the ICC is still in the process 
of setting norms as to its own scope and jurisdiction. Thus far, one of the 
key jurisdictional questions that has defied resolution is the place of 
complementarity in deciding whether certain criminal issues of international 
concern should be tried before the ICC or national tribunals? Although the 
Rome Statute crystallizes definitions of core international crimes that may 
be tried before the ICC, the process of determining whether to leave 
jurisdiction with the nation or allow jurisdiction to lie with the ICC 
continues to lack structure and appropriate guidance. 
In the midst of this norm-creating and norm-setting moment in the 
codification of international criminal law, the ICC has, at times, set an 
overly high bar for the hearing of international criminal law cases. In doing 
so, the ICC may not only be forgoing the opportunity to prosecute alleged 
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Chanbonpin, Sudha Setty, Charles Jalloh, as well as the participants of the 2011 Northeast 
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paper, for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to my research assistants, 
Melissa Lussier and Katherine Tonkovich, and our research librarian Renee Rastorfer, for 
their work. Unless otherwise noted, translations from the French (and concomitant errors) 
are my own. 
1. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July; 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/english/rome_statute%28e%29.pdf. 
2. The drafters of the ICC made the requirement that the ICC complement states' 
domestic jurisdictions a central component of its authority. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, 
pmbl. '1] 10 ("Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this 
Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.") & art. 1 ("It shall be a 
permanent institution and ... shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions."). 
Pmbl '1] 6 of the Rome Statute also recalls "that it is the duty of every State to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes." See also JANN K. 
KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE RoME STATUTE AND NATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTIONS 4 (2008) (noting that the ICC "is supposed to function as a permanent reserve 
court, which steps in when effective national suppression of ICC crimes is absent" (internal 
quotes omitted)). 
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war criminals, but is also setting an example for States Parties3 to avoid 
domestic prosecutions. This is not a new phenomenon; the question of what 
standard for prosecution should be set by the international community has 
arisen repeatedly over the past century and again in recent years, and it is a 
fly in the ointment of international criminal justice. 
Different and conflicting approaches have already been voiced,4 
lending urgency to the project of clarifying complementarity during this 
norm-setting phase in the work of the ICC. This Article recommends a new 
normative complementary framework for application of core crimes in 
national jurisdictions-a necessary step in order to strengthen the ICC's 
ability to act as an effective body in punishing war criminals, improving 
accountability of governments complicit in atrocity crimes, and deterring 
future atrocities. 
Emblematic ofthis problem is the case of Bosco Ntaganda, a third-in-
command of the Congolese rebel group Forces Patriotiques pour la 
Liberation du Congo (FPLC). 5 The Office of the Prosecutor for the ICC6 
had alleged that Ntaganda engaged in the war crime of conscription of child 
soldiers, in addition to crimes against humanity and other crimes.7 The Pre-
3. For a list of current States Parties, those sovereign States that have ratified or 
acceded to the Rome Statute, see The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL CoURT, http:/ /www.icc-cpi.int/en _menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states% 
20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited May 12, 2013). 
4. See generally William A. Schabas, Victor's Justice: Selecting "Situations" at the 
International Criminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 535, 538 (2010) (discussing 
limitations on ICC jurisdiction as a reserve court). 
5. See infra Part I.C. 
(). See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 42(1) (establishing the Office of the Prosecutor 
and its mandate to "act independently as a separate organ of the Court. It shall be responsible 
for receiving referrals and any substantiated information on crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court, for examining them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions before the 
Court"). 
7. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision on the Prosecutor's 
Application for Warrants of Arrest, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, ~~ 25, 34, 40 (Feb. 10, 
2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc530350.pdf [hereinafter PTC I 
Warrants Decision] (noting that domestic courts were to some extent dealing with other 
allegations with regard to Ntaganda). It should be noted that Ntaganda was twice offered a 
role within the Congolese Army- first in January 2005 (see D.R. Congo: Army Should Not 
Appoint War Criminals, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 14, 2005), http://www.hrw.org/ 
news/2005/0 1/13/dr-congo-army-should-not-appoint-war-criminals ), and then again in 2009 
(see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "You WILL BE PUNISHED": ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS IN EASTERN 
CONGO 129 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
drcl209webwcover2.pdf). Ntaganda again left the army in April 2012 (see D.R. Congo: 
Bosco Ntaganda Recruits Children by Force, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 16, 2012), 
http://www .hrw.org/news/20 12/05/15/ dr-congo-bosco-ntaganda-recruits-children-force), and 
has for some months been absent from public scrutiny (see David Smith, Hunting the 
Terminator: Congo Continues Search for Bosco Ntaganda, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 28, 2012), 
http:/ /www.guardian.co.uk!world/20 12/nov/28/terminator-search-bosco-ntaganda-congo ). 
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Trial Chamber of the ICC recognized that the Democratic Republic of 
Congo was unwilling or unable to prosecute Ntaganda for the alleged war 
crimes,8 leaving criminal accountability for those crimes to the mechanisms 
of international criminal justice. However, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber-a 
chamber within the ICC with the responsibility for threshold jurisdictional 
questions-acting without sufficient guidance, opined that the ICC was 
simply not the appropriate venue to try individuals such as Ntaganda.9 Had 
the Pre-Trial Chamber's opinion stood, it would have legitimized the 
impunity of Ntaganda and cemented the precedent of a narrow jurisdiction 
at the ICC, and that would enable the impunity of others like Ntaganda. 10 
Had that occurred, it would have indicated a lost opportunity for the ICC, 
nations interested in prosecuting war crimes, and the international 
community as a whole. This Article seeks, in part, to enable discourse on 
how to broaden ICC's jurisdiction through means at both the domestic and 
internationallevels. 11 
Part I analyzes the problem of the current trajectory of the ICC with 
regard to its jurisdictional scope. Looking at the development of 
transnational and international responses to atrocity crimes, including its 
burst of development in the last twenty-five years, this article recognizes 
that the Rome Statute was drafted with the intention of covering a broader 
range of cases than the ICC is currently handling. The intended scope 
includes the prosecution of alleged war criminals who were at senior, mid-
level, and lower levels of authority in committing grave crimes. However, 
the potential scope of the ICC to reach such actors has been progressively 
narrowed since the inception of the Rome Statute due to prosecutorial 
discretion and resource constraints at the international level. This problem 
is exemplified by the 2006 Pre-Trial Chamber decision not to issue a 
warrant of arrest for Bosco Ntaganda, a high-ranking alleged war criminal 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo; this is rectified, in part, by the ICC 
Appeal Chamber's review of that decision. Part I also addresses how 
national courts have failed to live up to their international obligations in not 
defining gravity12 broadly so as to encourage the ICC to find that the 
8. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, '1!40. 
9. Id. '1!89. 
10. See infra notes 65-70 for the Appeals' response. 
11. The matter of Bosco Ntaganda' s case at the ICC is discussed in more detail infra in 
Part I.C. 
12. While the terms "grave" and "gravity" were used often throughout the twentieth 
century in the context of describing the harms that the international community sought to 
prevent, the terms did not require precision until their use created a jurisdictional trigger for 
the International Criminal Tribunals. See Margaret M. deGuzman, How Serious Are 
International Crimes? The Gravity Problem in International Criminal Law, 51 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 18, 21-22 (2012) (arguing that although there is common understanding that 
a gravity standard has been met in cases of mass atrocities such as those in Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia, the definition of gravity has not yet been properly established). 
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prosecution ofNtaganda and others who are similarly situated are within its 
jurisdiction. 
Part II considers the historical context of international criminal justice 
in two respects. First, it reviews efforts at establishing extra-national 
criminal justice mechanisms and notes that, historically, effective 
development of transnational legal processes has depended on nations 
engaging in norm-setting dialogue that has strengthened and underpinned 
international criminal justice mechanisms by giving meaning to the 
definitions used by international tribunals and the scope of those tribunals' 
work. Second, it argues that the jurisdictional narrowing currently occurring 
at the ICC is not a new phenomenon, but instead, it reflects a historical 
pattern of the international community attempting to define the jurisdiction 
of international criminal processes broadly, only to see those processes 
narrowed and limited over time. As such, the current narrowing of 
jurisdiction puts the ICC at the brink of lost opportunity to make permanent 
an institution that can be truly effective in prosecuting and deterring atrocity 
cnmes. 
Part III analyzes the slow process and the confusion in the 
development of the law divided by the roles of the Office of the Prosecutor, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber, and the Appeals Chamber. The Article suggests 
further development at the domestic level in order to set broader 
jurisdictional norms for the ICC, which the ICC would then be permitted 
under the Rome Statute to consider. 13 
This Article concludes by suggesting a new normative framework to 
ensure that the ICC can defy historical patterns and live up to its potential. 
In particular, this Article recommends that States Parties to the Rome 
Statute engage further in transnational legal processes with regard to the 
question of complementarity. By engaging in interaction, debate, and 
discourse, States Parties can enable a broader understanding of what 
constitutes gravity within national courts, thereby engaging in positive 
norm-setting that resonates with the ICC as it continues to build the 
architecture for its own determinations of jurisdiction. Such a process 
would support efforts to allow for an interpretation of those crimes that 
would give guidance to victim groups, world leaders, and the world 
community such that binding internalization of norins would work toward 
the ultimate goal of protecting vulnerable populations. 
13. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 2l(l)(c) (requiring that the I.C.C. consider 
"general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the 
world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this 
Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards," but 
only where the Statute, treaties, and principles and rules of international law are not clearly 
applicable). 
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I. THE NARROWING SCOPE OF ICC's JURISDICTION 
The ICC is still in the early phases of its development. As such, its 
norms with regard to questions of jurisdiction are still malleable and open 
to interpretation. Yet the current trends suggest that the ICC's jurisdiction 
has narrowed significantly from what was envisioned by the Rome Statute. 
National courts are not picking up the slack and prosecuting atrocity crimes. 
As a result of these two trends, the ICC is now at risk of falling far short of 
what the framers of and signatories to the Rome Statute intended. 
A. The Rome Statute and Complementarity 
In recent years, a number of cases relating to international criminal 
law have focused on genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
(together referred to as "atrocity crimes"). 14 The cases vary depending on 
the situation: some cases and situations are before the ICC, a permanent 
institution with broad prospective jurisdiction over atrocity crimes. 15 At the 
same time, a number of ad hoc international institutions have been created 
to deal with specific post-conflict situations such as the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda,16 the Extraordinary 
Chambers of the Court of Cambodia,17 and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone. 18 Additionally, national trials in Guatemala/ 9 Peru/0 and other 
14. See, e.g., David Scheffer, Closing the Impunity Gap in U.S. Law, 8 Nw. U. J. INT'L 
HUM. RTS. 30, 2 (2009). 
15. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. (recognizing that the State Parties to the 
Rome Statute are "[d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of [the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole] and thus to contribute 
to the prevention of such crimes ..."). 
16. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993 
to create a mechanism for accountability over the war crimes and atrocities that occurred in 
the early 1990s in the various conflicts occurring in the former Yugoslavia. See S.C. Res. 
827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). Likewise, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) was established in 1994 to seek accountability for the Rwandan 
Genocide and other grave breaches of international law. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). Both the ICTY and ICTR are considered groundbreaking as the 
first post-Nuremberg international criminal tribunals, and the first to be set up through a 
Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. See Erik 
Mose, Main Achievements ofthe ICTR, 3 J.INT'L CRIM. IDST. 920, 927 (2005). 
17. See G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. Doc. AIRES/57/228 (May 27, 2003) (The Extraordinary 
Chambers of the Court of Cambodia is most accurately characterized as a hybrid tribunal 
since it is a national court that was created in a coordinated effort with the United Nations. It 
is staffed by national and international judges and applies international laws. Its mandate 
includes trying former Khmer Rouge members for war crimes and atrocities committed in 
Cambodia during the 1970s.). 
18. See S.C. Res 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (The Special Court for 
Sierra Leone was established by the United Nations and Sierra Leone as a hybrid entity- a 
national court that was created in a coordinated effort with the United Nations, is staffed by 
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places engage in domestic interpretations of international law and the nature 
of atrocity crimes. 21 
The most basic common thread among all of these aforementioned 
courts is their goal of seeking accountability for the worst crimes offending 
ethnic and national societies as well as the international community. The 
work of these courts should be considered as national and international in 
nature,22 since they address crimes and actions that both the international 
and national communities would like to punish and deter in the future. In 
order to be effective at this work and to maintain legitimacy at both levels, 
courts must rely on both national and international mechanisms of 
prevention.23 The aspiration of this multi-level system is that those who 
committed atrocity crimes -whether as senior leaders of a group, mid-level 
authorities or lower level operatives - can be prosecuted and held 
accountable for their actions. 24 
The difficulty arises in that international and national mechanisms 
have different strengths, limits, and, to a certain extent, deontological 
purposes. The Rome Statute25 creates the ICC as a body independent from 
national and international judges, and applies international laws. Its purpose is to try those 
accused of atrocity crimes and war crimes committed during the internal conflicts in Sierra 
Leone that began in 1996.). 
19. See World Report 2012: Guatemala, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/ 
world-report-2012/guatemala (last visited May 12, 2013) (Since 2009, sporadic trials for war 
crimes occurring during Guatemala's decades-long civil war have been ongoing. They 
represent a small measure of accountability for the number of atrocity crimes that occurred 
during the conflict.). 
20. See Simon Romero, Peru's Ex-President Convicted ofRights Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 7, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/world/americas/ 
08fujimori.htrnl?_r=O (In 2009, Peruvian courts applied national and international law to 
convict former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori of, among other charges, crimes against 
humanity in the killings of twenty-five people by military death squad in the 1990s.). 
21. The obligation of national courts to function on two levels - both domestic and 
international- is discussed in Part I.C. See infra pp.l4-18. 
22. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. (recognizing that the States Parties to 
the Rome Statute are "[d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of [the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole] and thus to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes."). 
23. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl ("Affirming-that the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their 
effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by 
enhancing international cooperation .. .");see also Markus Benzing, The Complementarity 
Regime of the International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice Between State 
Sovereignty and the Fight Against Impunity, in 7 MAx PLANCK Y.B. OF UNITED NATIONS L. 
591, 597 (2003) (suggesting the ICC could be used to protect against victor's justice by the 
state). 
24. See generally C. H. Beck et al., Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article (Otto Triffterer 2d ed. 
2008) [hereinafter Commentary]. 
25. By a vote of 120 to 7 (with twenty-one states abstaining), the international 
community put forth the Rome Statute, allowing for a complementary supranational court to 
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and not directly controlled by the States Parties to the treaty of the court or 
the United Nations, but in relationship with the United Nations system.Z6 
While a state, in dealing with harms occurring within that state's 
jurisdiction, may take measures at a national level through legislation, 
administrative mandate, or judicial action, in any case, it would continue to 
act as the state. As such, the state may be placing the interest of the state 
ahead of 'justice," which is sometimes amorphous and uneasily defined. 27 
In those circumstances, the potential exists for interference in the judicial 
processes of the state by parts of the state apparatus seeking to prevent 
prosecution of crimes for political reasons or otherwise. 28 
The Rome Statute attempts to account for that concern with its 
provisions on complementarity and admissibility by striking a balance and 
allowing the States Parties to take the lead on prosecuting atrocity crimes 
by making the following inadmissible to the ICC: (1) the state that has 
jurisdiction over the case is investigating or prosecuting the crime; (2) the 
investigating or prosecuting state is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry 
out the investigation or prosecution; or (3) after an investigation, the state 
with jurisdiction has decided not to prosecute, but the decision resulted 
from the unwillingness or inability of the state to genuinely prosecute; and 
(4) the case does not have sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court.Z9 Under this standard, States Parties to the Rome Statute would have 
the first opportunity to engage in a good faith investigation into the alleged 
crimes?0 
The complementary nature of the ICC has raised many questions 
about the demarcation of responsibility between the national courts and the 
try alleged perpetrators of some of the crimes of primary interest to the international 
community. M. CHERJF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 32 (1998) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (For more 
information on the Rome Statute, see generally COMMENTARY, supra note 24). 
26. See generally COMMENTARY, supra note 24. 
27. KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 322 (highlighting the distorting effects of domestic 
political pressures). 
28. Such interference occurred in conjunction with the lack of domestic prosecution of 
high-ranking officials with regard to the situation in Darfur, Sudan, alleging genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity. See generally Matthew H. Charity, The Criminalized 
State: The International Criminal Court, the Responsibility to Protect, and Darfur, the 
Republic of Sudan, 37 Omo N.U. L. REv. 67 (2011). The refusal to arrest Omar al-Bashir by 
government officials in Kenya stands as an example of that interference challenged by 
internal judicial processes, as the Kenyan Supreme Court in November 2011 found that al­
Bashir's arrest must go into effect should he visit Kenya in the future. See James Macharia, 
Kenyan Court Issues Arrest Order for Sudan's Bashir, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2011, 1:50PM 
EST), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/ll/28/us-kenya-bashir-icc-idUSTRE7 AROYA20 
111128. Likewise, such interference has occurred with regard to the ongoing situation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. See infra Part I.C. (discussing the case ofBosco Ntaganda). 
29. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17. 
30. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. (stating that the ICC "shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions ..."). I d. art. 1. 
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ICC. Much of the scholarship relating to the complementary nature of the 
ICC's jurisdiction relates to antagonistic complementarity31 -the ability of 
the ICC to intervene by taking jurisdiction where the state with primary 
jurisdiction fails to genuinely investigate or prosecute credible allegations 
of crimes falling within the ICC's jurisdiction?2 Other scholars focus on the 
obligation of national courts to prosecute atrocity crimes, noting the 
possible obligation to implement the laws against international crimes 
"subject to the ICC's jurisdiction in their national laws and furthermore to 
establish extra-territorial, universal jurisdiction which enables their national 
criminal courts to adjudicate these crimes even if they have been committed 
abroad by a foreign national. "33 
Even states that do not recognize an obligation on the part of States 
Parties to incorporate those criminal provisions into their internal law have 
frequently adopted the language of the Rome Statute to increase the state's 
ability to cooperate with the ICC, both in support of the Rome Statute and, 
potentially, to enforce decisions taken by the Security Council.34 
If the ICC fails to use this norm-setting moment in the codification of 
31. By antagonistic complementarity, I reference the theory that the ICC will serve to 
shame and blame states that fail to properly prove willingness and ability to prosecute 
crimes. See, e.g., KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 320 (citing A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 353 (OUP, Oxford 2003), stating as one of complementarity's chief merits 
"the indirect but powerful incentive to [national courts] becoming more operational and 
effective, inherent in the power of the ICC to substitute for national judges, whenever they 
are not in a position to dispense justice or they deliberately fail to do so [ ...] ."); see also 
Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law: Rebuilding National 
Courts Through Transnational Networks, 50 B.C. L. REv. 1, 51 (2009) ("The primary role 
that the ICC was expected to play in post-conflict states parties was to spur domestic 
prosecution of known perpetrators to avoid the perceived loss of face and sovereignty costs 
of having the ICC pursue those prosecutions internationally."). This is distinct from the 
concept of (1) negative complementarity, which does not of necessity seek compliance 
through a shaming mechanism, but only empowers the ICC to act where there is a lack of 
action by national courts, and (2) positive complementarity, which looks to the ICC to 
engage with states that otherwise would have jurisdiction to further enable those states to 
prosecute alleged crimes. 
32. See e.g., Jann K. Kleffuer, The Impact of Complementarity on National 
Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. J. 86, 87 (2003) 
[hereinafter Kleffuer, The Impact of Complementarity]. 
33. Id. at n. 18 (quoting the Memorie van Toelichting Wet Internationale Misdrijven, 
Dutch Explanatory Memorandum on Substantive Implementing Legislation Kamerstukken II 
2001/02, 28 337, nr. 3 (MvT) pp. 2 & 18). 
34. See, e.g., id. at n. 13 (citing Spanish Progress Report on ratification and 
implementation of the Rome Statute to the Council of Europe, available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi/Source/ICC/4th%20Consult%20ICC%20%282006%29%2 
008%20E%20Spain.pdt); see also Scheffer, supra note 14, at 3 ("Paradoxically, even as a 
non-party to the Rome Statute of the ICC (the 'Rome Statute'), the United States today 
essentially stands more exposed to its jurisdiction than do American allies that have 
modernized their criminal codes."). 
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international criminal law35 to expand on protections to those subject to 
atrocity crimes, States Parties seeking to avoid the time, expense, and 
political repercussions of their own prosecutions would have a strong 
argument that domestic prosecutions would engage in overreach. The 
expansion of international criminal law represented by the creation of the 
ICC would, in effect, make way at this early stage for the contraction of 
international criminal justice. 
B. The Gravity Standard Since the Inception ofthe International Criminal 
Court 
In negotiating the Rome Treaty during the 1990s, drafters drew much 
of the language defining the particular underlying crimes over which the 
ICC would have jurisdiction from recent precedent: the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;36 the Statutes for the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia37 and 
Rwanda;38 and the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind.39 
The interaction and transnational dialogue that was prevalent after the 
U.S. Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, and the World Wars40 at all times 
demanded an interpretation of protection from atrocities, and the extent of 
punishment for wrongdoing was lacking in the context of the development 
of the ICC. For the majority of the pre-Rome Statute period, there existed 
little interest in the creation of a fairly powerful permanent institution with 
components of criminal law authority. Because the emphasis of pre-Rome 
Statute criminal justice efforts was largely retrospective and specific 
35. See generally, Lisa J. LaPlante, The Domestication oflnternational Criminal Law: 
A Proposal for Expanding the International Criminal Court's Sphere of Influence, 43 J. 
MARSHALL L. REv. 635, 639-42 (2010); see generally Schabas, supra note 4. 
36. See generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/ 
humanrts/instree/xlcppcg.htm (defining genocide in legal terms for use in the international 
community). 
37. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to 
Paragraph 2 ofthe Security Council Resolution 808,, 12, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) 
(statute establishing jurisdiction and parameters for the ICTY); S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993) (deciding that an international tribunal was necessary to try 
atrocity crimes in the former Yugoslavia). 
38. See generally S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the 
ICTR and annexing its statute). 
39. See generally Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security ofMankind, Int'l 
Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532; GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1996) (reporting 
to the U.N. General Assembly with a code that derives from the Articles of the Nuremberg 
Charter, which also derive description of criminal acts from the World War I Commission). 
40. The transnational legal process engaged in after each of these conflicts is discussed 
in detail in Part II infra. 
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(responding to previous problems of which we have become aware from 
recent experience) as opposed to developing best responses for the 
problems that we have today or are likely to face prospectively, much of the 
discussion has focused on the application of general principles of criminal 
law regarding rights of the accused, the application oflex lata41 at a time of 
legal development, and interpretation of treaty provisions in a strict sense 
such that the defendant benefits from any confusion in the law of the ICC.42 
While this incrementalism and limited scope may give comfort to 
States Parties signing the Rome Statute that smaller steps will prevent 
surprise and allow for the Office of the Prosecutor to develop clear and 
cogent theories of a fairly narrow reading of the case, this very behavior 
undermines some of the purpose of the ICC.43 Further, based on the 
observed difficulty of prosecution by an international tribunal, criminal 
trials undertaken by individual states may suffer from every structural and 
procedural weakness of the ICC, but without the perceived autonomy or 
international legitimacy (in many cases) that the ICC has. 44 
C. The Case ofBosco Ntaganda and the ICC's Problematically Narrow 
Jurisdiction 
The difficulties are best seen in considering norm development within 
the ICC's structure. Article 58 of the Rome Statute requires that the Pre-
Trial Chamber45 issue a warrant of arrest if after examining the application 
and the evidence submitted by the Prosecutor it determines that "[t]here are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within 
41. Indeed, questions of whether the ICC would focus only on settled law (lex lata) and 
not deal with more poorly defined law in development (lex ferenda) influenced the selection 
of these cognizable international crimes and forestalled the implementation of a defined 
crime of aggression. 
42. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 24 (Non-retroactivity ratione personae). 
43. See, e.g., Uwe Ewald, 'Predictably Irrational'- International Sentencing and Its 
Discourse against the Backdrop of Preliminary Empirical Findings on ICTY Sentencing 
Practices, 10 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 365, 383 (2010) (noting that "acceptance of penalties is 
directly related to an understanding of usefulness of criminal punishment"); Julian Ku & Jide 
Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian 
Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 777, 780-81 (2006) (challenging the notion that 
International Criminal Tribunals actually serve to deter crimes). 
44. The resistance received by certain states that were more likely to allow for trials of 
higher ranking officials under a theory of universal jurisdiction evidences this problem: the 
financial incentives to allow for greater trade and to continue involvement in regional 
organizations may influence states such as Afghanistan, Belgium, and Spain to create laws 
that will limit rather than further enhance jurisdiction. 
45. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 34(b) (establishing a Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the ICC to deal with, among other duties, admissibility of cases to the Trial 
Chamber of the ICC). 
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the jurisdiction of the Court. "46 Due to complementarity concerns and the 
ICC's reserve status, the ICC only has jurisdiction where the case is of 
sufficient gravity for the higher level of international consideration.47 
On February 10, 2006, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC refused to 
grant a warrant for the arrest of Bosco Ntaganda, the third-in-command of 
the Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo (FPLC), the military 
arm of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC).48 The Pre-Trial Chamber 
recognized that Ntaganda conscripted, trained, and forced children under 
the age of fifteen to participate in hostilities.49 Ntaganda was subject to an 
arrest warrant in Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo, on charges of joint 
criminal enterprise, arbitrary arrest, torture, and complicity of 
assassination.50 Although the arrest warrant was issued, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo did not seek Ntaganda for the conscription of child 
soldiers, which would be considered an atrocity crime. 5 1 
In reviewing the case against Ntaganda, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
decided to look at whether a claim would be admissible to the ICC52 prior to 
making a determination of whether to issue a warrant for Ntaganda's 
46. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 58(l)(a). 
47. While not probative of the proper interpretation, the travaux preparatoires may be 
considered to confirm an understanding of a treaty, under a customary law application of the 
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, art. 32(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 351. 
One can, therefore, look to The Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court, Vol. I, G.A. 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, A/51/22 (1996) to 
confirm Article 17's limit on the scope of jurisdiction: "There was general agreement 
concerning the importance oflimiting the jurisdiction of the Court to the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community as a whole, as indicated in the ... preamble, to 
avoid trivializing the role and functions of the Court and interfering with the jurisdiction of 
national courts." DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 394. 
48. The Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo (FPLC) was the military wing 
of the Union des Patriotes Congolais, a Congolese political and militia group formed in the 
early 2000s. See Justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Background, HAGUE 
JUSTICE PoRTAL (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=l1284. 
The FPLC was suspected of engaging in numerous war crimes, including the conscription of 
child soldiers and the killing of civilians and U.N. peacekeepers. Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index. 
php?id=6174 (last visited May 12, 2013). 
49. See Justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Background, HAGUE JusTICE 
PORTAL (Dec. 17, 2009) http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=11284; see also 
DR Congo: Arrest Bosco Ntagandafor ICC Trial, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 13, 2012), 
http ://www.hrw. org/news/20 12/04/13/ dr-congo-arrest-bosco-ntaganda-icc-trial (detailing 
allegations of the various war crimes in which Ntaganda was involved, including ethnic 
cleansing, rape, torture and the conscription and training of child soldiers). 
50. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, '1['1[ 25, 34, 40 (acknowledging that domestic 
courts were adequately dealing with these allegations with regard to Ntaganda). 
51. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, 11 25, 34, 40 (discussing the failure of 
domestic courts to address the conscription issue). 
52. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 17, 19, 53, 58. 
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arrest.53 The Pre-Trial Chamber then set a standard that matched the 
Prosecution's own prioritization of cases using a gravity standard,54 "that, 
as a general rule, the Office of the Prosecutor should focus its investigative 
and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those who bear the greatest 
responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organisation allegedly 
responsible for those crimes."55 
Therefore, the Pre-Trial Chamber set up a definition of a gravity 
threshold for admissibility based on the language of the Rome Statute that 
asked three questions, all of which had to be answered affirmatively for the 
case to be considered admissible. 56 First, the Pre-Trial Chamber asked 
whether the conduct alleged was "systematic" or occurred on a "large 
scale."57 The next question was whether the potential defendant can be 
considered a "senior leader" in committing the alleged war crimes. 58 The 
final element was consideration of whether the role played by the potential 
defendant warranted admissibility to the ICC. 5 9 
The Pre-Trial Chamber recognized that the alleged policy/practice of 
53. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, ~~ 17- 20. 
54. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(d), ("[T]he Court shall determine that a case 
is inadmissible where ... [ t]he case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court." 
55. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, ~ 62 (quoting Paper on Some Policy Issues 
Before the Office of the Prosecutor, 7 (2003), http://www.amicc.org/docs/OcampoPolicyPaper9 _ 
03.pdf.) 
56. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, ~ 64. The Pre-Trial Chamber defined the 
gravity standard as follows: 
any case arising from an investigation before the Court will meet the gravity 
threshold provided for in article 17(1)(d) of the Statute if the following three 
questions can be answered affirmatively: 
i) Is the conduct which is the object of a case systematic or large scale 
(due consideration should also be given to the social alarm caused to the 
international community by the relevant type of conduct)?; ii) 
Considering the position of the relevant person in the State entity, 
organisation or armed group to which he belongs, can it be considered 
that such person falls within the category of most senior leaders of the 
situation under investigation?; and iii) Does the relevant person fall 
within the category of most senior leaders suspected of being most 
responsible, considering (1) the role played by the relevant person 
through acts or omissions when the State entities, organisations or 
armed groups to which he belongs commit systematic or large-scale 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and (2) the role played by 
such State entities, organisations or armed groups in the overall 





59. Id. See also Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, 6 
(2003), http://www.amicc.org/docs/OcampoPolicyPaper9 _ 03 .pdf. 
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enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen into the FPLC, 
and causing them to participate in active hostilities, caused social alarm; the 
Pre-Trial Chamber looked at the scale of the conduct and found it to be 
regional instead of national and, therefore, not widespread. 60 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber then concluded that Ntaganda's role in the organization as third in 
command of the military wing meant that he had little control over the 
political wing of the organization and that his responsibilities were more 
limited than the most senior leaders of the organization. 61 Finally, the Pre-
Trial Chamber considered Ntaganda's inability to sign agreements binding 
the political organization62 and the lack of social alarm at his acts63 showed 
that his arrest would not serve as a deterrent to other leaders. Because of 
these findings, the Pre-Trial Chamber denied the requested warrant of arrest 
and concluded that the prosecutor should focus its efforts on others who 
were the most senior leaders. 64 
The Appeals Chamber65 pointed out numerous flaws in the Pre-Trial 
Chamber's analysis. First, it noted that Ntaganda was deeply involved with 
the recruiting of child soldiers, that the war crime with which he was 
charged did not require it be widespread, and that there was nothing in the 
Rome Statute that would allow for the subjective "social alarm test" that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber applied. 66 Second, the Appeals Chamber concluded that 
failing to arrest Ntaganda would put a large number of alleged criminals on 
notice that they need not fear arrest, even for serious crimes. 67 Under the 
Rome Statute, this deterrent effect is one of the purposes of maintaining a 
broad scope for admissibility of cases similar to that of Ntaganda.68 Third, 
even if Ntaganda was not the most senior leader in this conflict, lower and 
mid-level operatives sometimes are (and should be) arrested to help build a 
case against the most senior leaders. 69 The Pre-Trial Chamber failed to 
60. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, '1!'\f 72, 84 (UPC/FPLC was merely a 
regional group operating only in the Ituri region.). 
61. !d. 'lf'lf 79, 82, 85, 89. 
62. !d. 'lf'lf 86, 87. 
63. The question of social alarm was not fully explained by the Pre-Trial Chamber, an 
issue raised in the review of the decision by the Appeals Chamber. 
64. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, 'lf'lf 86, 87. 
65. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 34(b) (establishing an Appeals 
Chamber for the ICC with jurisdiction to review decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber and the 
Trial Chamber). 
66. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Judgment on the Prosecutor's 
Appeal against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the Prosecutor's 
Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58," Case No. ICC-0 1/04-169, 'lf'lf 69-72 (July 13, 
2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc183559.pdf [hereinafter Appeal of 
Pre-trial Chamber I]. 
67. Appeal of Pre-trial Chamber I, supra note 66, 'lf'lf 73-77. 
68. !d. 'lf'lf 77-78. 
69. !d. 'If 77. 
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acknowledge or apply these purposes of the Rome Statute. 70 
The potential effect of the initial failure to prosecute in the Ntaganda 
case may be profound. First, there was a ripple effect on other situations 
being considered for admissibility to the ICC. The decision not to prosecute 
Ntaganda led to the expansion of a loophole created by an agreement with 
the government of Uganda in 2003 in another case. 71 Second, from a norm-
setting perspective, the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision not to prosecute gave 
rise to the practice of the ICC not prosecuting perpetrators other than those 
few most responsible. Indeed, in issuing a decision for the warrant of arrest 
ofOmar al-Bashir,72 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I noted in 2009 that the flawed 
test offered in the Ntaganda case was still the only standard for 
consideration by the ICC, presuming the ICC considered it appropriate to 
determine the admissibility of a case on gravity grounds. 73 
D. Domestic Courts and International Legal Obligations 
The failure of the ICC to act in cases like that of Ntaganda is 
exacerbated by the lack of top-down pressure on domestic courts to 
prosecute, the failure of domestic courts to fulfill their international 
obligations, and the failure of State Parties to engage in transnational 
interaction and discussion regarding harms in violation of international 
principles and the adoption by states of mechanisms for the vindication of 
human rights. Adding to these shortcomings, the purported sanctioning 
tools of negative complementarity failed to provide a remedy to at risk 
populations. 
1. Lack ofTop-Down Pressure 
Unfortunately, the same standards that lead to compliance pull may 
evidence the limits on complementarity's applicability. An ability to 
comply with the letter of the law - here, the terms of the Rome Statute -
'may undermine some purposes of international criminal law. Prosecutorial 
70. See Appeal of Pre-trial Chamber I, supra note 66. 
71. See Emmanuel Mulondo & Gerald Walulya, Uganda: 'No Amnesty for Rebel 
Leaders,' ALLAFRICA (Apr. 19 2006), http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200604180779.html; 
KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 325 ("[T]he prosecutorial policy of limiting the action of the 
Office of the Prosecutor to a certain category of individuals found reflection in the 
amendment of the Amnesty Act, thus equally limiting the scope of potential national 
investigations and prosecutions to these persons."). 
72. See Charity, supra note 28, at 72-77 (explaining the background of the situation in 
the Darfur region of Sudan, as well as allegations made against Omar al-Bashir). 
73. Situation in Darfur, Sudan, In the Case of the Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad al-
Bashir (Omar al-Bashir), Case Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09, n. 51 (Mar. 04, 2009), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf. 
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discretion allows States Parties wide latitude to refuse to try cases, and 
states are not under significant pressure to reach beyond the highest level 
offenders in their prosecutorial decisions. 
In determining whether States Parties have complied with their 
international obligations to prosecute, the ICC first looks to the terms of the 
Rome Statute,74 the Elements of Crimes,75 and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.76 Second, the ICC looks to applicable treaties other than the 
Rome Statute, and principles and rules of international law including 
established principles of the Law of Armed Conflict.77 Lastly, only absent 
general principles of international law, the ICC considers principles derived 
from national laws of legal systems of the world, where those laws are not 
inconsistent with the Rome Statute, or with international law and 
internationally recognized norms and standards.78 Notwithstanding and 
separate from these recognized sources of law, the ICC may apply 
interpretations of principles and rules of law from its own previous 
decisions, which one might presume would not conflict with the Rome 
Statute or other international standards of international criminallaw.79 None 
of these mechanisms put a significant amount of pressure on domestic 
courts to fulfill their international obligations. 
2. Transnational Legal Processes 
Were national courts more actively describing their own 
understanding of the core crimes, similar to the analyses that must be made 
in considering potential prosecutions by the ICC, there would be greater 
interaction among parties trying to achieve the goal of ending impunity, and 
helping to determine a causal law that might prevent harm to populations 
74. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(a) (lex specialis relating to statutory 
interpretation ofiCC-instituted International Criminal Law). 
75. See generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 
(2011 ), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ff5dd7d2.html. 
76. See generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND 
EVIDENCE (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal% 
20texts%20and%20tools/official%20joumal/Documents/RPE.4th.ENG.08Febl200.pdf. 
77. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 2l(l)(b). 
78. Id. art. 2l(l)(c). The drafters compromised further by stating that "general principles 
oflaw derived by the Court from national laws oflegal systems of the world include[s], as 
appropriate, the national laws of the States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the 
crime ...." Id. Although such a reading might prevent harm to the accused under the nulla 
poena sine lege standard, in that the accused might have greater awareness of the illegality of 
an act under, for example, national or territorial jurisdiction of a particular state, the 
Conference of the ICC Statute "rejected the view of some delegations that the phrase 
'including, as appropriate' should be replaced with 'especially'." COMMENTARY, supra note 
24, at 703. Thus, the laws of the state that would normally exercise jurisdiction have no 
presumptive authority greater than other national laws oflegal systems of the world. 
79. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(2). 
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caused by atrocity crimes. 
Taking a transnational legal process approach,80 national 
representatives have in previous contexts adopted or recognized existing 
principles under international law norms,81 met in groups to discuss 
implementation of international law standards, 82 and have pushed for the 
internalization of those standards within a transnational, supranational, or 
international structure. 83 
The concern over restrictive standards undermining the object and 
purpose of the Rome Statute, and the principles of law the Statute supports, 
could be raised in the selection and prosecution of a number of cases and 
80. Harold Hongju Koh describes the transnational legal process as having three phases: 
One or more transnational actors provoke an interaction (or series of interactions) with 
another, which forces an interpretation or enunciation of the global norm applicable to the 
situation. By so doing, the moving party seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to 
internalize the new interpretation of the international norm into the other party's internal 
normative system. The aim is to 'bind' that other party to obey the interpretation as part of 
its internal value set. Such a transnational legal process is normative, dynamic, and 
constitutive. The transaction generates a legal rule, which will guide future transnational 
interactions between the parties; future transactions will further internalize those norms; and 
eventually, repeated participation in the process will help to reconstitute the interests and 
even the identities of the participants in the process. Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay, 
Why Do Nations Obey International Law? The New Sovereignty: Compliance with 
International Regulatory Agreements by Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, 106 
YALE L. J. 2599, 2646 (1997) (emphasis added); see also Leila Nadya Sadat, The Nuremberg 
Paradox, 58 AM. J. CoMP. L. 151, 162 (2010) (describing "the existence oftransnationallegal 
processes that lead courts, especially, to adopt international norms," in the context of French 
adoption of the Nuremberg principles in prosecutions of crimes against humanity). 
81. See, e.g., MANUALOFTHELAWSOFWARONLAND(Oxford, Sept. 9, 1880), available 
at http://www.icrc.org/ihVINTR0/140?0penDocument (noting that the Institute of 
International Law "believes it is fulfilling a duty in offering to the governments a 'Manual' 
suitable as the basis for national legislation in each State, and in accord with both the 
progress of juridical science and the needs of civilized armies ... [and, in not trying to add 
new law, the Institute] contented itself with stating clearly and codifying the accepted ideas 
of our age so far as this has appeared allowable and practicable." Id. at Preface (describing 
this facet of transnational legal process as interacting from a positivist (or objective law) 
perspective)). 
82. See Robert 0. Keohane, Jr., Institutional Theory and Realist Challenge after the 
Cold War, in NEOREALISM & NEOLIBERALISM 269 (David A. Baldwin ed., 1993) (describing 
this facet of transnational legal process as interpreting the standards in specific contexts 
through commissions or other institutions). This is an institutionalized perspective that 
eventually looks to the International Law Commission or its committees for guidelines as to 
the development of the ICC. 
83. This could be described as a constructivist approach- determining the constitution 
ofrules related to the identified norms, and allowing for the further implementation ofnorms 
through that construct. See John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? 
Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52(4) INT'L ORG. 855, 871 (1988) 
(noting that "Constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up a particular class of 
consciously organized social activity-that is to say, they specifY what counts as that 
activity."). 
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for many reasons. One important area in which the conflict in rule-setting 
with regard to the definition of crimes has clearly arisen is the consideration 
of gravity as an indicator of admissibility on both qualitative and 
. . d 84quant1tat1ve groun s. 
Considering the usurpation of authority a potential indicator of overall 
governmental incapacity or specific complicity with the alleged crime 
suggests an incentive for state governments to make every effort to retain 
authority over adjudication. 85 In doing so, however, the state tribunals need 
not behave as though exercising powers delegated to the States by the ICC, 
and therefore limited to the interpretation of those powers by the ICC. 
Rather, to the extent the articulation of specific crimes by the ICC reflects 
jus cogens forbidding atrocity crimes,86 the adoption and implementation by 
states of the ICC statute creates an opportunity for states to define the 
jurisprudence of international criminal law in conjunction with the ICC 
statute. 
3. The Decoupling ofState Actors' Roles and Redoubling ofa State 
Actors ' Efforts 
The lack of transnational legal process is not the only obstacle to 
positive norm-setting on the national level. In addition, States Parties are 
failing to live up to their own obligation to act on two levels and with two 
purposes: on the national and international level; and with the dual purposes 
of 1) enforcing domestic norms and 2) informing and enriching 
international norms in the process. 
The concept of jus cogens or "compelling law" that allows no 
derogation is a kindred spirit to the notion of le droit des gens, or "the law 
of people" described by French law professor and original member of the 
UN International Law Commission Georges Scelle. 87 In Scelle' s Precis du 
droit des gens, he cites to Montesquieu's definition that "Laws are 
84. See, e.g., Ewald, supra note 43, at 371; see generally Schabas, supra note 4. 
85. KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 317-18 ("Complementarity. bestows upon national 
proceedings the pedigree of 'willingness' and 'ability' when the Court determines that a case 
is inadmissible in accordance with Article 17(1)(a) to (c) of the Statute."); id. at 320 
(discussing the "largely antagonist premise on which the regime of complementarity is based 
... [where States] want to avoid the embarrassment that a declaration of admissibility would 
entail."). 
86. In agreeing to the particular crimes included in the Rome Statute, some states noted 
that this would not create additional laws. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §103 (1965), cmt. K, Reporter's Notes 6; id. § 
702 (listing state violations ofperemptory norms). 
87. See, e.g., Hubert Thierry, The Thought of Georges Scelle, 1 EuR. J. INT'L L. 193, 
198 n.lO (1990) (using the "law of people" as opposed to the more typical translation "Law 
ofNations" clarifies the role of the individual as "the only genuine subject[] of international 
law."). 
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necessary relationships which derive from the nature of things," to lead to 
the concept of a law of integration and progress leading to "objective 
law."88 Because this objective law conforms to social necessities, positive 
law that derogates from objective law- that fails to conform to those social 
necessities -becomes anti-legal, and may be rejected. 89 Binding positive 
law gains its validity from the bundle of conditions necessary for the 
existence of a social fact, without which the social fact could neither come 
about nor persist.90 These purported causal laws that support social 
functioning are not necessarily enunciated as positive law, but are the basis 
around which legislators might construe and assess positive law. 91 
88. ld. at 199 (citing GEORGES SCELLE, PRECIS DU DROIT DES GENS, 37 (Vol. I. 2008), 
for the concept that objective law develops from social reality). See also, Georges Scelle, 
Regles Gemirales du Droit de fa Paix, in 46 RECUEIL DES COURS DEL'ACADEMIE DE LAHAYE 
327 (1933) [hereinafter Scelle]: 
Le droit objectif est !'ensemble des lois causales qui determinent !'apparition, 
la permanence et le developpement du fait social .... La traduction normative 
de ces lois causales immanentes s'appelle le droit positif. Le droit positifn'est 
done, par defmition, que la transposition sur le plan normatif des lois causales 
d'une societe. Cette transposition peut etre d'ordre coutmnier ou instinctive; 
d'ordre legislatif, reglementaire; d'ordre autocratique ou conventiennel .... Il 
se peut, il est meme frequent, que le droit positif differe et s, ecarte du droit 
objectif, que la norme sociale difrere de la loi causale, soit parce que 
l'infmnite de l'agent coutmnier ou legislatif empeche le droit objectif d'etre 
totalement peryu, soit parce que les insuffisances techniques de !'organisation 
sociale empechent une totale juxtaposition du systeme de lois et du systeme de 
normes. Cependant, par une hypothese necessaire, il faut considerer comme 
acquis, jusqu'a preuve contraire, qu'il y a coincidence exacte entre l'un et 
l'autre, car sans cela le droit positifne pourrait pas avoir de valeur obligatoire. 
La validite (geltung) du droit positif reside, en effet, dans sa concordance avec 
le droit objectif. ("Objective law is the conglomeration of causal laws which 
determine the appearance, permanence, and development of social facts . . . . 
The normative translation of these self-made causal laws is positive law. 
Positive law, then, is only, by definition, the transposition of a society's causal 
laws onto a normative plane. This transposition can be either through custom 
or instinct; through a legislative or regulatory means; from a despotic or 
conventional society .... It can happen, it's even frequent, that positive law 
differs and separates from objective law, that the social norm differs from the 
causal law, either because a weakness in the customary or legislative agent 
prevents the law from being totally perceived, or because insufficient 
technique in the social organization prevents a total juxtaposition of the 
system of norms and the system of laws. However, as a necessary hypothesis, 
one must take for given, until the opposite is proven, that the two exactly 
coincide, because otherwise positive law could have no obligatory value. The 
validity ofpositive law rests, in effect, in its agreement with objective law."). 
!d. at 348-50. 
89. Thierry, supra note 87, at 199. 
90. Id. (A rule not necessary toward the existence of a social fact would therefore not be 
"objective law."). 
91. !d. at 198. 
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In the context of international, supranational, and extra-national 
relations, actions taken by state actors "are by nature international, since 
their goal, and result, is to realize this phenomenon of [legal monist] 
solidarity or international relations, and they are, and can only be, 
accomplished in conformity to international norms."92 While the state actors 
could, therefore, act from a national or international perspective, and where 
there exist no specifically international leaders or agents, the state leaders 
and agents that stand in for the specifically international leaders/agents take 
on a "double role."93 They are national agents and leaders when they 
function in the state juridical order; they are international agents and leaders 
when they act in the international juridical order. 94 Scelle describes this -
dedoublement fonctionnel - as the fundamental law of the uncoupling of 
functions, but most describe it as "role splitting."95 
In the context of complementarity before the ICC, some have posited 
that instead of having to uncouple a national and international function, the 
national court and the international court exist in a relation of role 
concurrence - in the first instance, the national court may take jurisdiction 
over the trial of an alleged perpetrator of an atrocity crime, but the 
international court will exercise its role in prosecuting the perpetrator when 
the national court's failure to prosecute activates the international court's 
concurrent jurisdiction. 96 Because they both may take responsibility for the 
92. Scelle, supra note 88, at 358 ("[1]1 reste que ces fonctions sont par nature 
internationales, puisqu'elles ont pour but et pour resultat de donner satisfaction a un 
phenomene de solidarite ou ades rapports internationaux et qu'elles sont et ne peuvent etre 
accomplies que conformement aux normes internationales."). 
93. See Antonio Cassese, Remarks on Scelle's Theory of "Role Splitting" 
(DMoublement Fonctionnel) in International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 210, 212 (1990). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 214. 
96. Some have referenced such an obligation as "role concurrence," or the simultaneous 
protection of important legal values of the international community and the national legal 
order. KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 32 (citing Otto Triffterer, Preliminary Remarks: The 
Permanent International Criminal Court-Ideal and Reality, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRJMINAL COURT-OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY 
ARTICLE 26-28 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999). While the concept of role concurrence is, indeed, 
a departure from Scelle's construct, it would appear less a departure in translating 
dedoublement as uncoupling - that is, each state that acts in the international community 
necessarily acts through its organs in both domestic and international spheres. Where law 
exists in the international sphere and international courts do not exist or are otherwise unable 
to implement that law, the courts of the state act to fulfill the obligations of the state. 
Because such courts are applying binding international standards on behalf of the state, the 
courts must uncouple the two roles that of state court with that of international court. The 
court doing otherwise would be anti-legal, undermining an international rule of law. See, 
e.g., Scelle, supra note 88, at 657: 
If the connection of juridical situations puts into play the competence of 
government actors of other states, or actors with concurrent responsibility, the 
role of government actors careful to procure the realization of law in a 
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prosecution, the international and national courts would share the role of 
preventing and punishing atrocity crimes. 97 
The potential for shared jurisdiction may deviate from the notion of a 
concurrent role as opposed to a shared role. To the extent that national 
courts have a responsibility to vindicate supranational or meta-nationae8 
harms arising from atrocity crimes, the role is certainly not dissimilar from 
that exercised by the ICC - both the ICC and national courts are 
prosecuting alleged perpetrators of atrocity crimes. Realistically, however, 
crimes vindicated by the ICC must be limited qualitatively and 
quantitatively by virtue of limited jurisdiction and resources, as well as 
concerns for sovereign control over criminal justice matters. 99 As such, the 
national courts have an opportunity to revisit the goal of what Scelle would 
refer to as the underlying "objective law," to determine which cases can and 
should be prosecuted by the national courts, even where the ICC would 
elect not to prosecute or would find the case inadmissible for lack of 
recognized interstate milieu will consist of a coercive act exercised on their 
governmental actor colleagues to obtain from them the regular utilization of 
their competences. 
See also id. at 667:  
We are preoccupied with intervention only in international relations. But we  
know as well that there's no divider between an internal juridical order and the  
international juridical order: the extent of the latter determines the structure of  
the fonner, and when the competence of subjects oflaw, including nationals in  
interstate commerce, are covered by an international norm, the application of  
this norm stems from international law, even in relations between the  
governing and the governed, immediate subjects of the law of people.  
97. This shared responsibility echoes the logic of the Responsibility to Protect, in that 
the state would have primacy over the international community, but the international 
community may need to act to put an end to crimes against humanity (including the crime of 
persecution through ethnic cleansing), genocide, or war crimes. See 2005 World Summit 
Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ,, 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 15, 2005) (United 
Nations General Assembly reaffirming World Summit Outcome on Responsibility to 
Protect, available at http://www.globalr2p.org/media/flles/wsod_2005.pdf [hereinafter 2005 
World Summit Outcome]; see also Gareth Evans, Crimes Against Humanity and 
Responsibility to Protect, in FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 2 
(Leila Nadya Sadat, ed. 2011); see generally Charity, supra note 28. 
98. "Meta-national" refers to the community of peoples, and the joint interest of the 
nation of nations, as opposed to any smaller group that may have bilateral or other smaller 
group commonalities at a level hierarchically superior to the nation (supranational). See 
KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 316 (claiming state promotion of matter from a national to the 
international realm ensures and protects "meta-national values, such as peace, human dignity 
and the needs of all mankind," in describing gradual development toward a "universal" law 
of the world community). 
99. Schabas, supra note 4, at 542, 544 (noting that there are simply not enough resources 
for international criminal tribunals to aspire to prosecute all international crimes within their 
jurisdiction, and that the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
explains the choice of situations selected by referencing the "gravity" of the situation). 
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gravity. 100 The role of the national court is, in the first instance, a greater 
role, because it may act without the strictures and limitations of the Rome 
Statute to prosecute perpetrators in a manner that effectively protects its 
populations prior to the ICC considering admissibility under a 
complementarity regime. 
None of this suggests that national courts should elect to use 
substantially different national standards over international standards; 
rather, because of the deontological differences in the international and 
domestic tribunals and the fact that international standards require different 
duties of international courts than of national courts, the use of international 
standards in the investigation and punishment of crimes against humanity 
by courts should and must be done differently in domestic tribunals than in 
international tribunals. 101 Even in approaching the same end, the 
complementarity regime and the history of the development of the atrocity 
crimes demand a different approach of national courts. 
4. Why Negative Complementarity Fails to Offer Sufficient Incentives 
to Ensure Enforcement 
Many commentators have considered the utility of the ICC from the 
perspective of negative complementarity. 102 In considering the object and 
purpose of the Rome Statute, negative complementarity is the ability of the 
ICC to initiate an investigation only after the state that would otherwise 
have jurisdiction has failed to do so.103 It is imperative to look at the goal of 
the international community and the roles of the state and the ICC in that 
process. The goal of the international community is the protection of human 
lives from the harms of aggressive war, genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes. However, these goals are not achieved when the ICC and 
the national courts and governments working complementary to each other, 
are on somewhat independent spheres under a negative complementarity 
framework. 
One theory supporting the framework of negative complementarity 
focuses on the principle of domestic interest in several ways: first, in 
promoting a positive world perception of the state's judiciary and its 
100. One might reference this as a "redoublement fonctionnel," or a functional 
redoubling of the state actor's efforts- exercising a metanational responsibility that the state 
could have chosen to opt out of, for the purpose of vindicating a core international 
responsibility. 
1 0 1. Cassese, supra note 93, at 213. 
102. See, e.g., Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, 
Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 107 (2009); 
William A. Schabas, Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19 
CRIM. L.F. 5 (2008); Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side ofComplementarity: The Effect of 
Article 17 ofthe Rome Statute on National Due Process, 17 CRIM. L.F. 255 (2006). 
103. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17. 
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general capacity and support for the rule of law over anti-legal. government 
acts or actors; 104 second, the state's interest in maintaining its sovereignty 
over matters arguably within its domestic sphere, as opposed to yielding 
sovereignty over certain criminal matters to an extra-national court; and 
third, the application of the underlying laws for which the extra-national 
court complements the state apparatus. 
These justifications for relying on a negative complementarity 
framework are predicated on the state's negative reaction to public censure 
or to an extra-national sense that an act by the state breaches an 
international obligation. Negative complementarity presumes that the state 
might take action to avoid its control over a situation being undermined, 
and that the state's reaching an agreement with the international community 
on the extent of the underlying laws - whether ultimately under state or 
international jurisdiction -will somehow undercut state interests. Negative 
complementarity at its heart suggests that the state will do all in its power to 
prevent the assertion of authority by the complementing body105 and, 
therefore, assumes that prosecution of many levels of alleged war criminals 
will take place at the state level in order to prevent extra-national control 
and influence. 
On the international level, negative complementarity also assumes 
that the ICC will do all in its power to prosecute an alleged atrocity crime 
perpetrator if the state will not. However, as previously discussed, from the 
perspective of limited resources, prosecutorial discretion, and a lack of 
norm-setting guidance toward a scope broad enough to encompass such 
crime, the ICC has not thus far lived up to its potential in this regard. 
More importantly, and not considered fully in the negative 
complementarity discourse, the role of the national tribunal can and should 
be broader than that of the international tribunal, where the state is willing 
and able to pursue a case against an alleged perpetrator. History shows that 
the development of the laws on atrocity crimes has been most successful 
when leaders were communicating with each other and, unfortunately, 
when their populations were impacted by the atrocities.106 While the 
104. See, e.g., KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 317 ("There is no need for international 
adjudicative fora if, and when, national courts can adequately achieve effective adjudication 
...." Jd. (citing to the requirement in the U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary Gen. 
on the Establishment of a Special Ct. for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 [10] (Oct. 4 
2000), that local courts in Sierra Leone acquire additional capacity prior to the determination 
of the international community's referring matters back to the state by limiting the longevity 
of the Special Court, implicitly recognizing a lack of capacity at the state level)). 
105. KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 320 ("for the first time in the history of international 
criminal law, State Parties have agreed ex ante that this failure [to adequately investigate and 
prosecute core crimes within its jurisdiction] will entail a concrete legal consequence: States 
forfeiting the claim to exercise jurisdiction, including over their own nationals and 
officials."). 
106. See deGuzman, supra note 12, at 20-22 (arguing that the development of laws 
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international court and the national court may have the same ultimate goal 
of responding to an objective law relating to the prevention of atrocity 
crimes, the roles ofthe courts differ. One failure of the international tribunal 
is the institutionalization of its voice and the impact of its interpretation. 
The example of the prosecution of Bosco Ntaganda illustrates the point. 
II. 	DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAWS CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH 
ATROCITY CRIMES 
To understand the development of international criminal law's focus 
on atrocity crimes through a transnational legal process lens, we must start 
where the nations focusing on atrocities are interacting. By looking at 
responses to wars, starting in the mid-nineteenth century, we can see the 
slow, but continuing, process of interaction, interpretation, and 
internalization of the socil:ll mitigation of war crimes, aggression, and 
crimes against humanity. 107 
This series of negotiations, accords, and conventions reveals two 
important lessons for current efforts at supporting a broad jurisdiction for 
international criminal justice mechanisms. First, the transnational discourse 
has been and can be an effective means of building state-level consensus as 
to norm-setting. From a transnational legal process perspective, these post-
conflict interactions among states with regard to the rights and obligations 
of occupying powers in late nineteenth century and twentieth century 
Europe offer important parallels to our contemporary questions as to how 
state-level discourse can act as a norm-setting mechanism vis-a-vis the 
rights and obligations of international tribunals. 
Second, the history reveals a striking pattern that persists today of an 
initial post-conflict push toward international criminal norms that would 
allow for broad prosecution of war crimes, only to have state-level 
insecurities lead to the narrowing of the scope of the international legal 
standards, a smaller number of prosecutions, and the resulting diminution of 
the initially sought-after accountability and deterrent effect. 
addressing atrocity crimes stemmed from atrocities suffered during World War II, and that 
subsequent development occurred after the mass atrocities occurring in Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia). 
107. See generally DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JlRl TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 
(Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, eds. 1988); see generally International Humanitarian Law -
Treaties & Documents- Methods and Means ofWarfare, ICRC.ORG, http://www.icrc.org/ihl 
(last visited May 12, 2013) (reflecting much ofthe interactions between the states). 
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A. The 1874 Brussels Conference108 
Following the Franco-Prussian War, fifteen European states gathered 
to discuss the laws of war, some of which had been violated during the 
course of the relatively brief, but bloody, conflict. 109 In considering a 
transnational legal process approach, the interaction of the states most 
affected by the war raised questions as to the proper approach to the 
treatment ofwar crimes. For example, the states had to address whether an 
occupying power such as Prussia had the right to defend itself against 
guerilla warfare by the militia-like francs-tireurs, 110 and the mass 
conscription of French citizens who were not regular soldiers, or whether 
these French citizens who acted in defense of their country deserved 
prisoner-of-war status. 
The fifteen states utilized the code developed during the United States 
Civil War by Francis Lieber111 in an attempt to develop an "International 
Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War." By building on the 
Lieber Code, which in turn relied on a number of seventeenth and 
eighteenth century European laws of armed conflict theorists, the leaders 
hoped to set stricter guidelines for warfare and post-conflict accountability 
mechanisms, as Lieber's code purported to be "strictly guided by the 
principles ofjustice, honor, and humanity." 112 
The Lieber Code required that soldiers show more discipline during 
war than civilians. Soldiers violating the Lieber Code might face the 
punishment of death, "or such other severe punishment as may seem 
adequate for the gravity of the offense." 113 The penal codes applicable to 
soldiers during combat would "not only punish [soldiers] as at home, but in 
108. See Yves Sandoz, The History of the Grave Breaches Regime, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 
657, 663-64 (2009). The article gives an excellent description of the development of grave 
breaches of the laws of war. For more on the resolutions undertaken by the states parties to 
the 1874 Brussels Conference on August 27, 1874, see International Humanitarian Law­
Project ofan International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Brussels, 
27 August 1874, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.ns:fJINTR0/135?0penDocument. 
109. For a cogent analysis of the conflict, see GEOFFREY WAWRO, THE FRANCO PRUSSIAN 
WAR (Cambridge 2003). 
110. Francs-tireurs, literally, "free shooters," were men living in eastern France who 
trained with high quality rifles and were sometimes affiliated with the French army. When 
franc-tireurs were captured, Prussians did not wish to treat them as captured enemy soldiers 
because the free-shooters did not dress in uniform or fight with an organized group. 
111. The code was entitled, "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field" but is generally referred to as the Lieber Code. See Ernest Nys, Francis 
Lieber---His Life and His Work: Part I, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 84, 86 (1911) (describing the 
contributions of Lieber to the internationalization of the laws of war). 
112. Sandoz, supra note 108, at 660; See also Francis Lieber, Instructions for the 
Government ofthe Armies ofthe United States in the Field, art. 4 (Apr. 24, 1863), available 
at http://www.icrc.org/ihl!INTR0/110 [hereinafter Lieber Code]. 
113. Sandoz, supra note 108, at 661-62; see also Lieber Code, supra note 112, art. 44. 
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all cases in which death is not inflicted, the severe punishment shall be 
preferred."114 The interactive response of several nations to the perceived 
violation of rights in the Franco-Prussian War allowed the parties to 
develop a shared standard and joint interpretation of the Lieber Code and of 
the laws and customs of war more generally. The transnational nature of 
this enterprise marked a significant advance in the international discussion 
of the prosecution of war crimes. 
The parties adopted the International Declaration concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War but did not create a binding convention. Thus, 
they did not bind themselves through positive law. Notwithstanding the 
failure to create a convention, one delegate suggested that states coordinate 
their internal legislation to ensure equal punishment for those violating the 
rules of war. 115 Perhaps due to a reluctance to cede a significant 
responsibility with regard to criminal justice to a larger decision-making 
body,116 this suggestion was not acted upon, leaving the parties' 
interpretation on the table at the end of the Brussels Conference. 
Regardless of the reason, these countries had come together following 
a conflict to consider parameters to behaviors of belligerents during time of 
war, seeldng to prevent the negative consequences of other states' 
overstepping those parameters. In so doing, the states came much closer to 
holding themselves accountable and created a framework from which to 
work in the future to define limits of warfare. 
B. The Oxford Manual of1880 
Notwithstanding the failure of the Brussels Declaration to be made 
into a convention, the Lieber Code was not without impact. In 1880, the 
Institute of International Law117 adopted its "Manual of the Laws of War on 
Land."118 Drawing principles from the Lieber Code and the 1874 Brussels 
Conference, the Manual stated that where the violation of the laws of war 
114. Sandoz, supra note 108, at 662; see also Lieber Code, supra note 112, art. 47. 
115. Sandoz, supra note 108, at 663. 
116. Id. 
117. The Institute of International Law (or Jnstitut de Droit International) is a non-
governmental body formed in 1873 to develop the standards of international law and 
promote human rights. See History, INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/navig_history.html (last visited May 16, 2013). For its influential work on 
developing international law, it was awarded the 1904 Nobel Peace Prize. 
118. The Laws of War on Land. Oxford, 9 September 1880, (Sept. 9, 1880), available at 
http:/ /www.icrc. org/applic/ihl/ihl.ns:fliNTR0/140?0penDocument&redirect=O. The preface 
to the Manual notes that it does not seek an international treaty laying out the laws of war, 
which the authors acknowledge "might perhaps be premature or at least very difficult to 
obtain," but that the Manual "strengthens the discipline which is the strength of armies; it 
also ennobles their patriotic mission in the eyes of the soldiers by keeping them within the 
limits of respect due to the rights of humanity." Jd. at Preface. 
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are at the same time offenses against the general criminal law, the 
perpetrator should be tried and punished by the courts of the injured 
adversary: "the offending parties should be punished, after a judicial 
hearing, by the belligerent in whose hands they are ... [with the ] offenders 
against the laws of war [being] liable to the punishments specified in the 
penal or criminal law," when the person ofthe offender could be secured. 119 
The articulation of this standard in 1880, which would. be repeated in a 
second Oxford Manual of 1913,120 would have a strong effect on the rules 
agreed to by the victorious powers that would be able to claim almost thirty 
years of recognition of the standard prior to seeking to apply it. As states 
sought consensus on the legal rights of states to prosecute war criminals, 
even those concerned with ex post facto laws recognized the right of the 
injured belligerent to prosecute the captured enemy under its own laws, the 
standard articulated by the International Law Institute's 1880 and 1913 
Oxford Manuals. 121 
C. The Hague Conference of1899 
Twenty-five years after the Brussels Conference, Europe and other 
states again gathered to reach a consensus in regards to the regulation of the 
laws and customs of war. 122 In June 1899, the Hague Diplomatic 
Conference revisited topics covered in the Brussels Declaration, including 
the legality of acts between occupying powers and citizens of the occupied 
state. 
Belgium, a smaller nation only recognized in 1830, was concerned 
that its sovereignty might be overrun by transnational norms created by 
more powerful states. It was particularly concerned that rights recognized in 
the Brussels Declaration granted too great a power to an occupying force 
and forbade the recognition of civilians as lawful combatants when fighting 
119. James W. Garner, Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War, 
14 AM. J. INT'L L. 70, 71 (1920) (citing ANNuAIRE DE L'lNSTITUT [DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL], 
174 (1881-1882)). 
120. See Manual of the Laws of Naval War (Aug. 9, 1913), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl!ihl.nsf!INTR0/265?0penDocument&redirect=O (noting the 
comparable application oflaws ofland warfare (Article 79), but also noting that prisoners of 
war are "subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the navy of the State in 
whose power they are." (Art. 73)). 
121. See, e.g., the acceptance of national tribunals to try combatants following World 
War I factoring in both the Commission Report (see infra note 135, at 121), and the 
Reservations of the United States (14 AM. J.INT'L. L. 95, 129 (1920)). 
122. Czar Nicholas II called the conference with the intention of "seeking the most 
effective means of ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace, and, above 
all, of limiting the progressive development of existing armaments." See Final Act of the 
International Peace Conference, The Hague, July 29, 1899, available at http://www.icrc.org/ 
ihl.ns£'INTR0/145?0penDocument. 
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an occupying force. 123 As opposed to codifying such a standard, the Belgian 
delegate argued, "In my opinion, there are certain points which cannot be 
made the object of a convention, and which would be better to leave as they 
stand today, under the rule of the tacit and common law which results from 
principles ofthe law ofnations."124 
In interpreting the language of the Brussels Declaration, the Belgian 
delegate recognized that the agents of the various states were interpreting 
and, potentially, codifying a standard that the representatives of smaller 
states could not support, because of the power recognized in states more 
likely through military strength (and in recent past experience) to occupy 
those smaller states. 125 The Belgian delegate reframed the question so that 
the Conference would not decide the legality or illegality of a particular act 
during war; rather, the Conference would determine whether new law 
would be needed as part of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land (later known as the Hague Conventions), limiting 
harms that could be perpetrated by either party. 126 
Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens served as a delegate from Russia, one of 
the Great Powers, which supported the principles recognizing rights in 
occupying powers. When the parties had reached an impasse as to the 
balance of power between international and domestic control of war crimes 
issues, Martens provided the following clause (later known as the Martens 
Clause) for adoption: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been 
issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to 
declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents 
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of 
the law of nations, as they result from the usages 
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of 
humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. They 
declare that it is in this sense especially that Articles 1 and 
123. For a discussion of the power dynamics between the delegations during the 1899 
Hague Conference, see Cassese, infra n. 124. 
124. Cassese, The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?, 11 EUR. J. 
INT'L L. 187, n.11 (2000) (citing Conference Intemationale de la Paix, La Haye 18 Mai-29 
Juillet 1899, Troisieme Partie (1899) at 111 ("Amon avis, il y a certains points, qui ne 
peuvent faire !'objet d'une convention et qu'il vaudrait mieux laisser comme aujourd'hui, 
sous !'empire de cette loi tacite et commune qui resulte des principes du droit des gens.")). 
125. Id. at 193-98. 
126. Id. 
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2 of the Regulations must be understood. 127 
The Belgian delegation supported this limiting language as a major 
check on potential occupying powers: "[t]omorrow, as today, the rights of 
the conqueror, far from being unlimited, will be restrained by the laws of 
public conscience (conscience universelle) and not one country, not one 
general would dare to transgress them, since that would submit oneself to 
banishment from the civilized nations." 128 Notwithstanding arguments over 
the accuracy of this characterization, the Conference sidestepped the 
specific dispute and reached agreement on a broader point. The States 
Parties to the Hague Convention of 1899 internalized not the right to 
engage in patriotic resistance to an occupying force, nor a standard for the 
applicable legal authority held by an occupying power, but the legal norm 
recognizing the place of laws of humanity and dictates of public conscience 
alongside the (non-conflicting) terms of the treaty. 129 By shifting the 
interaction - the question of what law the parties sought to reach agreement 
on - the interpretation and internalization of the norm became much 
broader, focusing on the process for legal interpretation rather than the 
primary law that would directly recognize authority in occupiers.130 
127. Id. at n.l. This component of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, known as the Martens clause after the Russian diplomat 
who recommended it, may do no more than to extend to those engaging in combat as francs-
tireurs the protections recognized for other lawful combatants, if it goes even that far. See, 
e.g., id. at 187-216 (arguing that custom did not permit attacks on the occupying force and 
would not have protected francs-tireurs, but Martens used the somewhat vague language of 
the clause to appease smaller countries while not affecting the responsibilities of the great 
Powers). Nevertheless, the reasoning allowed for under the Martens clause calls for the 
application of recognizable but not fully enunciated rules over a variety of circumstances not 
yet fully developed. Again, it may be of interest that the smaller states, such as Belgium, are 
looking to the protection of individuals (under the droit des gens) as opposed to the rights of 
states. 
128. Id. at n.29 (citing Conference Intemationale de la Paix LaHaye 18 Mai-29 Juillet 
1899, Troisieme Partie (1899) at 153) ("Demain comme aujourd'hui les droits du vainqueur, 
loin d'etre illimites, seront restreints par les lois de la conscience universelle et pas un pays, 
pas un general n'oserait les enfreindre, puisque ce serait se mettre au ban des nations 
civilisees."). 
129. Indeed, Cassese references the speech made by Martens after Martens tabled his 
proposal of the clause: "Il ... faut se rappeler que ces dispositions [on lawful combatants 
and mass conscription (levee en masse)] n'ont pas pour objet de codifier tous les cas qui 
pourraient se presenter." ("We must recall that the object of these clauses is not to codify 
every eventuality that could present itself."). Id. at n.l8. Despite Cassese's (and Martens') 
view that the clause was meant to deal only with these two aspects of guerilla warfare, the 
defense of the limitations on the clause make the very point raised by the Belgian delegate-
the smaller states could continue to look to custom and general principles in response to the 
overwhelming force of an occupying power. 
130. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 375, 408, (dissenting opinion) (arguing that "the basic function of the Clause was to 
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Although the 1899 Hague Convention called only for state liability for 
compensation and not for criminal sanctions, the normative effect of the 
Martens Clause's adoption allowed for a second iteration in the 1907 Hague 
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and the 
adoption of language at that point reflected a belief in the legality of 
reliance as legally cognizable the public conscience and laws of humanity 
moving forward in interpreting lawful conduct in times of armed conflict 
between states. 131 
D. The 1919 Treaty ofVersailles 
Following World War I, the most powerful nations in Europe 
convened again to continue their discussions on how to resolve the issue of 
concurrent powers and the allocation of prosecutorial power to the 
international level. The transnational legal process that led to the 
recognition of liability for violations of the laws of war in the Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were coupled with questions of individual 
culpability that came to the forefront during the Peace Conference of 1919. 
The Commission of Responsibility of Authors for the War (the 
Commission of Responsibilities, or the Commission) was tasked by the 
Peace Conference to deal with questions of war crimes and international 
accountability. 132 The Commission investigated the causes of war and 
evaluated the ability of the several Allied powers to create a tribunal 
appropriate to try offenders against the laws and customs of war. 133 It 
distinguished this responsibility from that of the development of an 
put beyond challenge the existence of principles of international law which residually 
served, with current effect, to govern military conduct by reference to the 'principles of 
humanity and ... the dictates of public conscience."') One should also note Martens' own 
investment in, and his reminder to his colleagues regarding, the Conference's successfully 
codifying some of the standards the Brussels Declaration had failed to codify. Czar 
Alexander II had convened the 1874 Brussels Conference, and Czar Nicholas II convened 
the 1899 Hague Conference, such that Martens reminded his colleagues that the failure of 
the diplomatic community to agree on specific treaty rules for a second time would show the 
military that diplomats could not fashion rules regarding the laws and customs of war, 
leaving the military free to interpret the laws of warfare as they p\eased. See Cassese, supra 
note 124, at 195. 
131. Although Cassese argues that Martens' references in the clause may have been a 
political expedient to appease the Belgians, Martens' belief in a limited natural law depiction 
of human rights foreshadows the "objective law" view of Scelle: "These [human] rights flow 
from the natnre and from the conditions of humanity and so cannot be created by legislation. 
They exist in themselves." [Ces droits [de l'homme] decoulent de la natnre et des conditions 
de l'humanite et ne peuvent done pas etre crees par la legislation. Ils existent par eux-
memes.] Cassese, supra note 124, n. 45 (citing Martens, Traite de droit international, vol. I, 
at 14 (1883-87)). 
132. See Paris Peace Conference, Violations of the Laws and Customs of War: Reports of 
Majority and Dissenting Reports American and Japanese Members of the Commission of 
Responsibilities, 1-2 (1919). Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. III, 203-05 (1919). 
133. Jd. 
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international tribunal and truth-gathering organization, a job believed to be 
better left to historians. 
As noted previously, the 1907 Hague Convention restated and 
reiterated the 1899 Martens Clause to call for a broader reading of positive 
law as expressed through principles and the laws of humanity, beyond the 
written word articulated in the codification completed during the 1899 and 
1907 Conferences. The continued interaction among institutional actors, 
such as other delegates who accepted the terminology of and purpose 
behind the Martens Clause, allowed for its repeated use through the 1919 
Peace Conference and its internalization by representatives of States 
Parties. 134 It was of particular import to the Commission that during the 
1907 negotiations, the German representative had taken a stance on the 
importance of international principles as guiding state actions. Rather than 
focus on formulating specific language for each eventuality, that 
representative had stated that certain acts would not be taken by the German 
Navy, not because of the codification undertaken by the Conference, but 
because such actions would be contrary to the unwritten law ofhumanity. 135 
That the German Navy used submarine mines during World War 1-
the very act that the German representative had stated need not be 
specifically forbidden by treaty136-was not lost to the participants in the 
1919 Peace Conference. The Commission appeared to take particular 
offense that "those Powers . . . a short time before had on two occasions at 
The Hague protested their reverence for right and their respect for the 
principles of humanity," had fully reversed position and committed those 
very acts only a decade later. 137 
The understanding that, on some level, nations had accepted the idea 
of a transnational unwritten law of humanity allowed the commission to 
decide that "the public conscience insists upon a sanction which will put 
clearly in the light that it is not permitted cynically to profess a disdain for 
the most sacred laws and the most formal undertakings." 138 However strong 
the desire was for an international sanction against Germany's war crime, 
134. Id. 
135. See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on 
Enforcement of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (Mar. 29, 
1919), 14 AM. J. INT'L. L. 95, 117-18 (1920) [hereinafter Commission Report]; see also id. n. 
65 (citing the declaration of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein to the Hague Conference of 
1907: "Military operations are not governed solely by stipulations of international law. There 
are other factors. Conscience, good sense, and the sense of duty imposed by the principles of 
humanity will be the surest guides for the conduct of sailors, and will constitute the most 
effective guarantee against abuses. The officers of the German Navy, I loudly proclaim it, 
will always fulfill in the strictest fashion the duties which emanate from the unwritten law of 
humanity and civilization."). 
136. See id. 
137. Id. at 117-118. 
138. Id. at 118. 
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the Commission was frustrated by the fact that the Hague Conventions had 
not set up a mechanism for the investigation and prosecution of a 
premeditated war of aggression.139 Instead, the Commission was only able 
to recommend, based on the gravity of the outrages upon the principles of 
the law of nations and upon international good faith, that certain acts "be 
the subject of a formal condemnation by the Conference," and that "for the 
future penal sanctions should be provided for such grave outrages against 
the elementary principles ofinternationallaw."140 
Due to past interactions and the development of standards over the 
course of the previous half-century, the Commission's treatment of laws 
and customs of war and the laws of humanity could be, and was, much 
broader than its treatment of aggressive war. The Commission concluded 
that "[a]ll persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their 
position may have been, without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of 
States, who have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of 
war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution." 141 This 
marked a remarkable shift since a decade ago, there was reluctance in 
putting into place international tribunals to prosecute war crimes. 
The Commission went even further, not limiting its recommendations 
with regard to international criminal prosecution to only those actually 
committing war crimes. In addition to the parties culpable for breaches of 
the laws of humanity, the Commission report added responsibility for those 
who failed to prevent violations of the laws or customs of war, which 
included some of the highest ranking military leaders and officials of the 
German government. 142 
During the course of the war, politicians and lawyers had called for 
the punishment of not just the immediate perpetrators but also of those with 
some degree of command responsibility. 143 However, at the war's end, all 
139. 	 Id. (stating that a suddenly declared war under false pretexts  
is conduct which the public conscience reproves and which history will  
condemn, but by reason of the purely optional character of the institutions at  
The Hague for the maintenance of peace (International Commission of  
Inquiry, Mediation and Arbitration) a war of aggression may not be  
considered as an act directly contrary to positive law, or one which can be  
successfully brought before a tribunal such as the Commission is authorized to  
consider under its terms of reference.).  
140. Id. at 120. Again, the Commission considers the gravity of the outrages on the 
principles of international law or the law of nations as creating sufficient reason for future 
penal action. 
141. Id. at 117. 
142. Id. at 121. 
143. See Gamer, supra note 119, at 88-89 (citing 39 REVUE PENITENTIAIRE 457 (1915) 
(according to Professor Weiss of the Law Faculty of the University of Paris, "I think ... that 
not only the direct immediate offenders should be held responsible, but tl!at we must go to 
the top; we must pass over the heads of the primary offenders, to the chiefs, to those of 
whom the soldiers and officers have been only the servants and valets.")). 
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parties were waiting to see whether the international community would 
maintain the will to actually prosecute that broad range of individuals. 144 
Some noted that Kaiser William II had instigated the war and believed his 
stepping down and trial would be good for international justice and 
morality, and would also benefit the German people in terms of having an 
international reckoning for a key player in starting the war. 145 The 
Commission held firm in its recommendation for a broad reach of potential 
war crimes culpability, encouraging its application for the first time to 
political leaders as wel1. 146 
Despite the strength of the Commission report, there were some 
doubts as to the wisdom of allowing international prosecution of war 
criminals. Even among the Allies in favor of the Commission report, some 
nationals questioned the logic of this submissive sovereignty - an 
international court may be prone to engage in overreach in making those 
decisions relating to imprisonment that were typically within the purview of 
the sovereign.147 Respected scholars were incredulous at the idea a 
sovereign would allow international tribunals of third states or enemy states 
to judge deeds typically left to the national courts. 148 
144. See, e.g., James F. Willis, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND 
DIPLOMACY OF PUNISIDNG WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 51 (Greenwood Press 
1982)(citing France's statement to Germany of October 4, 1918: "Conduct which is equally 
contrary to international law and the fundamental principles of all human civilization will 
not go unpunished .... The authors and directors of these crimes will be held responsible 
morally, judicially, and financially. They will seek in vain to escape the inexorable expiation 
which awaits them."). 
145. See, e.g., id. at 38 (noting former U.S. President Howard Taft stating, "William was 
behind it all the time," and former U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain Joseph Hodges Choate 
hoping the war would "put an end to this Imperial Dynasty and give the people of Germany 
a chance."). 
146. See Commission Report, supra note 135, at 116-17. 
147. See HARRY D. GOULD, THE LEGACY OF PUNISHMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 
(Palgrave MacMillan ed. 2010) (discussing sovereignty as the contrapositive to punishment 
in defining sovereignty as that which exists above punishment) .. 
148. See Garner, supra note 119, at 71, n.2, (quoting a speech from Professor Louis 
Renault, 1907 Nobel Peace Laureate and participant for France in the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Peace Conferences, in which Renault was asked about the enforceability of a provision in a 
treaty of peace requiring delivery of principal offenders against the laws of war to triers 
outside ofthe defendants' nations: 
I do not see how a government, even if conquered, could consent to such a 
clause; it would be the abdication of all its dignity; moreover, almost always, 
it is upon superior order that infractions on the law of nations have been 
committed. I have found the proposal excessive, though I understand the 
sentiment that inspired it. I cite it because it shows well to what point men, 
animated by justice and shocked by what has taken place, desire that the 
monstrosities of which French and Belgians have been victims should not go 
unpunished. 
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Despite these concerns, the Commission suggested two mechanisms 
of prosecution. First, each belligerent would have the power to set up, or 
use from its current system, an appropriate domestic trial venue that would 
enforce international norms. 149 Second, the Peace Conference could create a 
high tribunal to try special cases, including (1) defendants belonging to 
enemy countries that have committed outrages against civilians and soldiers 
of several Allied nations; (2) persons in authority whose orders affected the 
conduct of operations against several of the Allied armies; (3) all civil or 
military authorities of enemy countries, regardless of rank, who ordered or 
failed to prevent violations of the laws or customs of war/50 and (4) such 
other persons who were most appropriately tried before an international 
tribunal. 151 Of note, the high tribunal would also have preference over 
national courts for the same offence, have the ability to transfer cases to 
national courts for inquiry or for trial and judgment, and would allow for 
prosecutorial discretion in case selection. 152 
The Commission stated that the tribunal would apply "the principles 
of the law of nations as they result from the usages established among 
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of public 
conscience."153 This language drawn from the Martens Clause would set 
sufficient parameters to allow for the trial of war criminals. The tribunal 
would "have the power to sentence [the guilty party] to such punishment or 
25 REV. GEN. DE DROIT INT. PUB. 25). See also Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past 
Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L. J. 2619, 
2638-39 (1991): 
Violations of human rights belong with crimes such as terrorism, narcotics-
trafficking, and destabilizing democratic governments, in a category of deeds 
which may, because of their magnitude, exceed the capacity of national courts 
to handle internally .... But if the establishment of international courts seems 
impossible, intermediate solutions could be implemented, such as the 
internationalization of jurisdiction, and the refusal of foreign courts to 
recognize amnesties, pardons, or special statutes of limitations for these kinds 
of crimes. 
149. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 121 (stating that each belligerent had the 
right to form "an appropriate tribunal, military or civil, for the trial of such cases ... [which] 
would be able to try the incriminated persons according to their own procedure, and much 
complication and consequent delay would be avoided which would arise if all such cases 
were to be brought before a single tribunal"). Again, this follows the recommendation and 
model law of the 1880 Manual of the Laws of War on Land, supra note 81. 
150. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 121 (authorizing trial of "all authorities, 
civil or military, belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, 
without distinction of rank, including the heads of states, who ordered, or, with knowledge 
thereof and with power to intervene, abstained from preventing or taking measures to 
prevent, putting an end to or repressing, violations of the laws or customs of war). 
151. Id. at121-22. 
152. Id. at 122. For example, the Commission plan states "the duty of selecting the cases 
for trial before the tribunal and of directing and conducting prosecutions before it shall be 
imposed upon a Prosecuting Commission of five members ...." 
153. Id. 
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punishments as may be imposed for such an offence or offences by any 
court in any country represented on the tribunal or in the country of the 
convicted person."154 Looking at the list of crimes reported by the 
Commission, the crimes are neither divided between war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, nor are they systematically compiled. 155 Instead, the list is 
illustrative of "diverse" and "painful" crimes, with additions "daily and 
continually being made." 156 None of the European powers serving on the 
Commission sought to challenge this fairly expansive power. The Martens 
Clause had matured into settled law for the states that had participated in 
the conferences leading to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. 157 
E. Challenges to the 1919 Commission Report 
In its challenges to the Commission Report, the US delegates raised a 
number of issues deriving from a claimed distinction between legal and 
moral obligations: the United States noted that "[t]he laws and customs of 
war are a standard certain, to be found in books of authority and in the 
practice of nations," while the "laws and principles of humanity vary with 
the individual," preventing them from being considered in a court ofjustice, 
particularly in the administration of criminallaw.158 Rather than vindicating 
154. Id. 
155. Sandoz, supra note 108, at 668-69 (arguing that the list, while "somewhat interesting 
historically, . . . cannot be viewed as the result of a serious and systematic work of 
scholarship carried out to show established doctrine or state practice."). 
156. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 113-115. 
157. Although only ten ofthe fifteen signatories to the 1907 Hague Convention served on 
the Commission on Responsibilities, eight of the ten- all but the United States and Japan-
recognized the Commission's Majority Report without reservation. 
158. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 134 (the United States representatives here 
distinguish between responsibilities of a legal nature and those of a moral nature). See also 
id. at 128. But see id. at 136 (arguing to the political question of sovereignty and head of 
state immunity); id at 139-140 (distinguishing to the submission of a non-binding 
commission of inquiry for aggressive war, to the extent anybody can investigate and 
distinguish between an aggressive and defensive posture, and to note that such a body would 
be responding to a moral and not legal question); cf id. at 146 (noting that tribunals to hear 
war crimes must consider only war crimes over which the individual states already have 
jurisdiction, as there was "no international statute or convention making a violation of the 
laws and customs of war-not to speak of the laws or principles of humanity-an 
international crime, affixing a punishment to it, and declaring the court which has 
jurisdiction over the offence"); cf id. at 147 (noting the United States was "averse to the 
creation of a new tribunal, of a new law, of a new penalty, which would be ex post facto in 
nature, and thus contrary to the Constitution of the United States and in conflict with the law 
and practice of civilized communities"); cf id. at 148 (noting that heads of state who violate 
the laws and customs of war "are, as agents of the people, in whom the sovereignty of the 
state resides, responsible to the people for the illegal acts which they may have committed, 
and that they are not and that they should not be made responsible to any other 
sovereignty"); cf id. at 129, 149 (stating that a head of state is morally, but not legally, 
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rights that exist according to the laws or principles of humanity-- a. term 
negotiated, adopted, and utilized within a European context-- the United 
States looked to apply the written laws of the parties regarding their own 
courts applying penal laws to enemy belligerents. 159 
The Japanese delegates similarly questioned whether international 
law recognized a penal law for a belligerent presumed guilty of a crime 
against the laws and customs of war, but appeared to challenge only the 
inclusion of heads of state in those to be charged under high tribunal, and 
the punishment for failure to "abstain[] from preventing or taking measures 
to prevent, put[] an end to, or repress[] acts in violation of the laws and 
customs ofwar."160 Thus, while the European members of the Commission 
on Responsibility looked to interpretations of law developed through and 
internalized following the Brussels Declaration and Hague Conventions, the 
United States and Japan did not recognize the developments as having 
achieved the standard of law in a strict sense. 
Eventually, following the first World War, the Allied governments 
decided to limit their requests, "only want[ing] to make an example. To try 
very large numbers would be to create great difficulties for the German 
Government," which some states viewed as easier to work with than a 
potential Bolshevist or Militarist Government. 161 State leaders shifted the 
membership of the Inter-Allied Mixed Commission162 from legal experts to 
those who would assist in the political expedient of selecting a number of 
cases for Germany to conduct, "to uphold moral principles and treaty 
rights."163 
While maintaining the commission structure, this signified the move 
toward a political solution over a legal one, moving away from legal 
concepts such as deterrence of, retribution against, and reparations from 
individual perpetrators toward recognition of culpability and reparations by 
the state. Thus, while states recognized the harm done by the parties 
responsible to mankind, such that the authority of the Commission was circumscribed by its 
mandate: to report on "facts as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed 
by the forces of the German Empire and its allies ..."). 
159. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 135. 
160. M. Adatci & S. Tachi, Reservations by the Japanese Delegation (Apr. 4, 1919), 14 
AM. J.INT'L L. 70, 152 (1920). . 
161. Willis, supra note 144, at ll7 (referencing the English view that the Allies should 
seek the surrender of "the most important and notorious offenders and let the rest go," and 
the French view to commence with "a few symbolic persons."). While even a shortened list 
of Germans sought by the Allies for trial had 1,580 alleged offenders on it, compromise 
among the Allies brought the list down to 890. Eventually, the Allies allowed Germany to 
try an almost negligible number of alleged war criminals. 
162. The Inter-Allied Mixed Commission was formed to "collect, publish and 
communicate to Germany details of the accusations made against each of the responsible 
persons" for war crimes during World War I. See Allied Note to President of German 
Delegation Respecting War Criminals, May 7, 1920, in 16 (4) Supp. AM. J. INT'L L. 195, 196 
(1922). 
163. Willis, supra note 144, at 124. 
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defeated during the war and could specify the criminal nature of that harm 
such that a majority of those states could agree to the propriety of criminal 
sanctions, political and economic expediency allowed the states to, in large 
part, step away from criminal process in response to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. 
F. The Nuremberg Charter ofthe International Military Tribunal 
Thus far, we have seen that Europe and increasingly, other world 
powers develop penalties for crimes engaged in during a conflict use war 
and legal issues raised through the conflict to crystallize legal questions 
regarding rights and responsibilities of parties to the conflict. Following the 
first World War, most of the great Powers of Europe had recognized a legal 
standard, but were unwilling or unable to enforce that standard. 
The twentieth-century saw the rise of a voluntary-positivist view of 
international law - law as an expression of the will of the state, based in a 
specific, legally cognizable source on which the state representative might 
rely. 164 In applying international law, the international community had to 
decide what weight to give arguments stating that a law reached customary 
status, or reflected a general principle.165 This happens whether the 
international community can interpret international law through a 
designated international body, or allows for interpretation of the law to 
164. While we celiainly saw as much in the United States response to crimes against 
humanity in the Commission report following World War I, we also see the International 
Couli of Justice struggle with sources of law. See, e.g., Competence of the General 
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 
5 (Mar. 3, 1950) (dissenting opinion ofiCJ Judge Alvarez): 
The common view that international law must be created solely by States is, 
therefore, not valid to-day-nor indeed has it ever been .... [New International 
Law's] point of depaliure is that, to-day, States are increasingly 
interdependent: and that consequently they do not form a simple community, 
as formerly, but rather a veritable international and organized society. This 
society in nowise abolishes the independence and the sovereignty of the 
States, nor their legal equality (Aliicle 2 paragraph 1, of the Chalier); but it 
limits this sovereignty, and the rights which flow therefrom, in view of the 
general interests of this society. 
In accordance with the Preamble to the Chalier, the new organization- and 
consequently, the new law which flows therefrom- must have the following 
ends in view: to maintain peace, to consider the general interest, to safeguard 
fundamental human rights, to promote co-operation between States, to bring 
their interests into harmony, to promote economic, social, intellectual and 
humanitarian progress. The old individualistic law had none of these purposes; 
it took account only of the interests of the individual [state] considered in 
isolation. 
!d. at 13-14. 
165. !d. 
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devolve back to the states. 
The bases of international law were recognized and formalized by the 
international community in the Charter of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, to be later restated in the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice. 166 Independent sources of international law include treaty 
law, customary international law, and general principles of law, with 
decisions of jurists and writings of scholars take on a supportive role in 
understanding the law. 167 These sources are a minimum - that is, courts 
may look to these sources and give them weight, notwithstanding 
arguments made by a party before the court that a particular source is not 
properly law. 168 The dynamics underpinning all of these sources of law 
were hotly debated at the end of World War II, 169 when the question of what 
international criminal justice mechanisms were desirable, available, and 
enforceable loomed large. 
The victorious states, as the United Nations, 170 prepared for the 
prosecution of Nazi war criminals at the end of World War II. The US 
delegate to the United Nations War Crimes Commission, Herbert Pell, 
sought retribution for atrocities committed against people on racial or 
religious grounds based on the application of the "laws of humanity" and 
suggested crimes committed against persons based on their race or religion 
constituted "crimes against humanity." 171 
British prosecutor Hartley Shawcross noted that crimes against 
humanity were different in kind from the crime against peace and the 
ordinary war crime. To a certain extent, the crime was carried out as part of 
the Nazi Party's total war policy, thereby raising international issues of 
166. U.N. Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993 
(1945) [hereinafter U.N. Charter]. 
167. Id. art. 3 8(1 ). 
168. See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain), 1994 
I.C.J. 112 (July 1994) (where the International Court of Justice finds the existence of a treaty 
notwithstanding denial of intent to treat meeting minutes as binding by party seeking to 
challenge I.C.J. jurisdiction.). 
169. Formulation of the Nilrnberg Principles, 2 YB. Int'l. L. Comm'n. 181,182-88 
(1950). Indeed, at a meeting of the International Law Commission in 1949, member Georges 
Scelle proposed that the International Law Commission "also formulate the general 
principles of international law underlying the Charter and the judgment [of the Niimberg 
Court]," but the proposal was rejected. Jd. at 189. 
170. The term "United Nations" in its current context was first used in a document 
describing twenty-six nations united "in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism." See United 
Nations, Declaration by United Nations (Jan. 1, 1942), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ 
ha/cun/photo06.html; see also United Nations, History of the United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/ (last visited May 17, 2013) (describing the United 
Nations' history). 
171. Michael R. Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 1945-46: A Documentary 
History 186 (Bedford Books 1997). 
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crimes against peace. 172 However, in addition to its impact on the 
international community, its criminalization derived from "matters which 
the criminal law of all countries would normally stigmatize as crimes-
murder, extermination, enslavement, persecution on political, racial or 
economic grounds." 173 Shawcross noted that the nations adhering to the 
Nuremberg Charter "felt it proper and necessary and in the interest of 
civilization to say that these things . . . were, when committed with the 
intention of affecting the international community ... not mere matters of 
domestic concern but crimes against the law of nations ...."174 
Again, we see the effects of a transnational legal process, albeit one in 
which the victorious powers following a conflict also acted with power in 
the domestic sphere as occupying forces. Notwithstanding that, there was 
the interaction of states and peoples - both allies and enemies - during a 
time of war and soon thereafter, trying to clarify the scope and nature of 
international criminal justice. As a supranational or international 
community, the rules that should have protected populations needed to be 
interpreted in a way that was acceptable within a legal framework, both by 
the prosecuting states and the citizens of states subject to trial; in doing so, 
the states and international community internalized the notion that these 
crimes were cognizable in the international sphere. By setting parameters 
for punishment following a specific conflict, the United Nations recognized 
an applicable international criminal system, and set about attempting to 
codify it, internalizing it for the victorious states as well as for those 
defeated during the war. 
G. Development ofAtrocity Crime Regulation Since Nuremberg 
In the years since Nuremberg, the scope of the jurisdiction of 
international tribunals has expanded in some contexts and faltered in others. 
This splintered approach reflects political pressures, financial constraints, 
decisions made based on prosecutorial discretion, and a persistent 
ambivalence toward international jurisdiction over atrocity crimes. 
Notwithstanding the inconsistencies in the approach of the United Nations 
bodies and member states responding to international criminal law issues, 
the trend of non-governmental organizations, the UN system, and states has 
been toward the development of standards and processes to enable the 
prosecution of international crimes. 
One of the initial agenda items of the nascent United Nations 
organization was the codification of the Nuremberg Principles, undertaken 
172. Id. at 188. 
173. Id. at 188-89 (citing Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International 
Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, 42 vols. 19:470-72 
(Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, 1947)). 
174. Id. 
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by the International Law Commission in a Draft Code of Offences against 
the Peace and Security ofMankind. 175 The International Committee for the 
Red Cross prepared a draft of re-articulated international humanitarian law, 
which after diplomatic Conferences in Geneva became the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions; some aspects of the Geneva Conventions clarified the need 
for states to prosecute grave breaches of the Laws ofArmed Conflict. 176 
The early 1950s saw an advance toward the ICC, and a move toward 
the end of impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity (including 
genocide) was progressing well. The international community came to 
accept that "[i]nternational law now protects individual citizens against 
abuses of power by their governments [and] imposes individual liability on 
government officials who commit grave war crimes, genocide, and crimes 
against humanity." 177 The General Assembly unanimously affirmed the 
principles of the Nuremberg Charter, which many courts, international and 
municipal, have understood as an authoritative declaration of customary 
internationallaw.178 
During the Cold War, distrust and power imbalances prevented the 
on-going codification and development of international criminal law, with 
some exceptions, prior to the development of the ad hoc tribunals. 179 
Despite this period where the growth of international criminal law slowed, 
development of international criminal law has increased greatly with ad hoc 
tribunals, the creation of the ICC, and the development of international 
175. Formulation of the Principles Recognized in the Charter of the Ntirnberg Tribunal 
and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, G.A./Res./177(II) (Nov. 21, 1947), available at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/038/84/IMG/NR003884.pdf? 
OpenElement: 
[T]o entrust the formulation of the principles of international law recognized 
in the Charter of the Ntirnberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal to 
the International Law Commission, the members of which will, in accordance 
with resolution 174 (II), be elected at the next session of the General 
Assembly, and directs the Commission to (a) Formulate the principles of 
international law recognized in the Charter of the Ntirnberg Tribunal and in 
the judgment of the Tribunal, and (b) Prepare a draft code of offences against 
the peace and security of mankind, indicating clearly the place to be accorded 
on the principles mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above. 
I d. 
176. Sandoz, supra note 108, at 673-75. 
177. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional 
Moment, 43 HARv. INT'L L. J. 2, 13 (2002). 
178. Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the "Grotian Moment": Accelerated Formation of 
Customary International Law in Times ofFundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 449, 
455 (2010). 
179. See generally BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL CRlMINAL JUSTICE AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Oxford 2003) (arguing that the Cold War period 
represented a time during which nations emphasized geopolitical concerns over the 
prosecution of war crimes); Frederic Megret, The Politics ofInternational Criminal Justice, 
13(5) EUR. J. INT'LL.l261 (2002). 
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criminal law claims in national jurisdictions. 
The first half of the twentieth century had raised the possibility of 
greater accountability for atrocities. Despite a lack of prosecutions, the 
arguments raised in the recommendation of the 1919 Commission on the 
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties180 advanced legal standards. Twenty-two perpetrators prosecuted 
at the IMT Nuremberg trial, as opposed to the trials of over 1,000 alleged 
perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity pursued under 
Control Council Law No. 10 by military tribunals in occupied Germany and 
in liberated or Allied nations, 181 already reflected a growth in the possibility 
of prosecutions of international crimes at international and domestic levels, 
even where the domestic courts were under the authority of occupying 
powers. The ICC and the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for 
Rwanda allowed for a greater number of trials to occur, both in the courts 
themselves and outside the international court context both in the 
completion strategies' recognition of domestic courts and the expansion of 
complementarity.182 
The question of the ICC's jurisdictional scope persists, with continued 
confusion regarding complementarity and the question of whether the ICC 
or national courts ought to try war crimes, atrocity crimes, and crimes 
against humanity. The reliance on the national courts makes structural 
sense, to the extent that the ICC recognizes the primacy of the national 
courts183 and is a reserve court, intended to take cases only when the 
national courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute the case, 
180. Again, but for the four areas of exceptional cases recommended for an international 
or mixed tribunal, the Commission recognized the right of each belligerent to try 
"incriminated persons" in the belligerent's custody in an appropriate military or civil tribunal 
existing under, or set up pursuant to, national legislation, and according to the belligerent's 
own procedure. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 121. Presumably the vast number of 
trials would have taken place within a national jurisdiction. 
181. Scharf, supra note 178, at 454; KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 34 (for the claim of over 
17,000 prosecutions in East Germany for crimes during the Second World War, with 1,800 
for capital offenses, citing C.F. Ruter, Door Nederland Gezochte .Oorlogsmisdadigers Allang 
Berecht Door de DDR-Prof. Ruter Krijgt Toegang Tot Stasi-achieven, 49 FOLIA 1-2, 8-11 
(1996)). 
182. Indeed, the completion strategies for the ICTY, List of ICTY Completion Strategy 
Reports, http://www.icty.org/sid/10016 (last visited May 17, 2013), and the ICTR, 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR Complete Strategies, http://www.unictr. 
org/ AboutiCTR/ICTRCompletionStrategy/tabid/118/Default.aspx (last visited May 17, 2013), 
called for their prosecutors to transfer cases of mid-level and lower-level perpetrators to 
national courts to allow the international courts to focus on the most responsible senior 
leaders. This dual track calls for the expanded use of national courts to deal with admittedly 
international issues. 
183. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 1, 17, 53, 58 (referencing complementarity, 
admissibility, and the issuance of a warrant of arrest when a case is within the jurisdiction of 
the Court). 
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notwithstanding the national court's obligation to prosecute.184 
Nevertheless, the Nuremberg Tribunal noted that individuals who commit a 
crime under international law can be punished for violations of international 
law. 185 The differential posture of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Rome 
Statute serve to highlight the tension in this area of concurrent powers 
between the international and national levels. Yet this tension is not new. 
The International Law Commission clarified as early as 1950 that the 
duties imposed on individuals by international law require no interposition 
of internal law, and reiterated the principle in the 1954 Draft Code of 
Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 186 The responsibility 
for compliance lies with the people, and the remedy for a breach should be 
immediately available, without further action taken by their leaders or 
government agents prior to the enforceability of the peoples' rights. Thus, 
the United Nations and its members recognized a right existing in 
individual persons, and prosecutable against individual perpetrators. 
However, it may be difficult to vindicate a right that individuals 
cannot pin down. In revisiting the language of the crimes against humanity 
provision of the Nuremberg Charter, interaction and interpretation led to 
fragmentation of an understanding of the crime's defmition. For example, 
the 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
specifically referenced (a non-exhaustive list of) crimes against humanity in 
187 Thethe context of whether such crimes must be in the context of a war. 
1991 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
referenced the same material, but expanded it into "Systematic or Mass 
Violations of Human Rights," and to conform to the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege, purported to make the list exhaustive. 188 
Because the violation of human rights would need to be of an 
extremely serious character, only systematic violation such as a constant 
practice or a methodical plan or mass scale (based on the number of people 
or the size of the entity affected) violations would fall within the 1991 
Code.189 The party violating the human right could be a public official, or 
"private individuals with de facto power or organized in criminal gangs or 
groups might also commit the kind of systemic or mass violations of human 
rights covered by the article ...."190 This response to systemic/mass scale 
184. See id. pmbl. 'lj'1[4, 6, & art. 1; Kleffner, The Impact ofComplementarity, supra note 
32, at 93-94. 
185. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment, 1 Int'l Mil. Trib. 52 
(1947); Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 2 Y.B. Int'l L. 
Comm'n 18 (1996) [hereinafter Draft Code] (emphasis added). 
186. 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 150 (1954). 
187. Id. 
188. See 2 Y.B. Int'l L.Comm'n 103-04 (1991). 
189. Id. at 103. 
190. Id. At 103-04. 
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human rights abuse was framed quite differently from the crime against 
humanity claims brought before the Nuremberg Tribunal. 191 
The 1993 and 1994 International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia (hereinafter, the "ICTY") and for Rwanda (hereinafter, the 
"ICTR"), respectively, split the difference in terms of their treatment of 
crimes against humanity for jurisdictional purposes. The ICTY Statute 
required that the perpetrator commit the crime against humanity during an 
armed conflict, but expanded the definition of the crime to include "other 
inhumane acts," such that the list no longer purports to be exhaustive. 192 
The ICTR Statute, on the other hand, did not require that crimes against 
humanity occur during armed conflict, but that the perpetrator must 
"commit [the crime] as part of a widespread or systematic attack against 
any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious 
grounds .... ,!93 
The International Law Commission continued to develop and codify 
the laws allowing for the prosecution of these international crimes, with 
additional changes. The 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind requires that a crime against humanity be "committed 
in a systematic manner or on a large scale and [be] instigated or directed by 
a Government or by any organization or group." 194 The International Law 
Commission commentary to the Draft Code claims to apply "the Charter of 
the Nlirnberg Tribunal, as interpreted and applied by the Niirnberg Tribunal, 
taking into account subsequent developments in international law since 
Ni.irnberg."195 
Instead of relying on the standard requiring a massive human rights 
violation to qualify as a crime against humanity, as indicated in the 1991 
Code, the 1996 Code points out that the Nazi policy of terror was "certainly 
carried out on a vast scale," in order to suggest that, if the crime is not 
systemic, but is widespread, it can still qualify as a crime against 
humanity. 196 This mirrors the type of standard and language used since the 
191. But see Schabas, supra note 4, at 536 (noting that, with the end of the Cold War and 
fall of the Berlin Wall, proposals for an international criminal court were strengthened by the 
growing emphasis of the human rights movement on accountability for atrocity crimes). 
192. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Fonner 
Yugoslavia since 1991, Updated Statute 
of the International Criminal Tribunal For The Former Yugoslavia http://www.icty.org/ 
x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute _ sept09 _ en.pdf (last visited May 17, 20 13). 
193. United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR): Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 61, http://www.unictr.org/Portals/O/English! 
Legal/Statute/2010.pdf (last visited May 17, 2013). 
194. Draft Code, supra note 185, at 47. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
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time of the Lieber Code.197 The requirement of group instigation or 
direction of the 1996 Code was new, and was intended "to exclude the 
situation in which an individual commits an inhumane act while acting on 
his own initiative pursuant to his own plan ... [particularly as] it would be 
extremely difficult for a single individual acting alone to commit the 
inhumane acts as envisaged in article 18 [the Crimes Against Humanity 
provision]."198 These variances in treatment by the Draft Codes of 1991 and 
1996 serve to illustrate the ongoing tension in defining what acts are grave 
enough to qualify as crimes against humanity and, therefore, should qualify 
for admissibility before the ICC. 
The Rome Statute defines Crimes Against Humanity as "any of the 
following acts [listing acts virtually identical to the 1996 Draft Code] when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack." 199 Not surprisingly, 
when U.S. Senators Durbin, Leahy, and Feingold introduced the Crimes 
Against Humanity Act of 2009, the Act tracked the language of the Rome 
Statute.200 
The baseline for a crime against humanity, specifically its attack 
requirement, appears to be higher than the standard set in the 1996 Draft 
Code, and different than the standard for crimes against humanity in the 
ICTY and ICTR Statutes. Thus, the standard appears to be narrower from 
the International Law Commission recommendation, notwithstanding the 
recognition by a majority of UN member states that the ICC has 
jurisdiction, that the United Nations through the Security Council may refer 
matters to the ICC under Security Council authority to maintain 
international peace and security,201 and that the right to protection from 
these harms belongs to individuals under international law, not to citizens 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art.7. 
200. See Scheffer, supra note 14, at 25-28. Ambassador Scheffer noted that the Act 
required the attack be systematic and widespread, while the Rome Statute allows for the 
attack on a civilian population to be systematic or widespread - but, given that the Rome 
Statute defmition describes an "attack directed against any civilian population" to mean "a 
course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in [the listing of 
crimes against humanity] against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a 
State or organizational policy to commit such attack ... ," the crime must be widespread 
(multiple commission) and systematic (pursuant to a policy), as formulated by the Rome 
Statute Elements of Crimes. Id. at 27. Thus, while the wording of the crime appears to be 
stricter than wording found anywhere else protecting against crimes against humanity, the 
distinction made no difference. 
201. See U.N. Charter, supra note 166, arts. 39, 41, 42. The authority of the Security 
Council has been the basis for referrals to the ICC in the situations in Darfur, Sudan, and in 
Libya, both non-parties to the Rome Statute at the time of referral (for a description of 
situations before the ICC, see http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_ menus/icc/situations%20and% 
20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx). 
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of states through their state governments. 
Assuming that the state has an obligation in the international sphere to 
enforce the international understanding of crimes against humanity and a 
responsibility to protect individuals within its borders from international 
crimes, it is unclear in this fragmented model which definition would apply. 
It could be the Draft Code as custom derived from state practice by the 
International Law Commission, or the Rome Statute as Treaty and the 
customary law adopted by over 120 states, or even the international 
tribunals created by the Security Council that have been in existence for 
nearly twenty years. 
III. MOVING FORWARD: THE ROLE AND OBLIGATION OF  
NATIONAL COURTS  
Previous parts of this Article outlined some of the failures of the ICC 
to live up to its potential and have traced the historical patterns that suggest 
that the ICC will continue to narrow its jurisdictional scope. This part offers 
potential solutions by considering how the current quandary surrounding 
ICC complementarity and definitions of gravity can motivate national 
courts to prosecute war crimes and engage in essential norm-setting 
behavior that will resonate on both the national and international level. 
The fact that ICC jurisdictional standards are still malleable creates 
the opportunity for national leaders and agents, judges, and non-
governmental organizations to demand a decrease in barriers when seeking 
a remedy, a greater number of trials, and the implementation of laws of the 
ICC as the law of the state by seeking the adoption of terms broader than 
that of the ICC statute as legislation within the state. While the perceived 
lack of legitimacy of national courts may indeed be an issue, the national 
courts' implementation of a lower threshold to entry than that of the ICC 
may be the only manner to effect both the underlying purpose of the Court, 
and to create a body of law from which other international criminal cases 
can begin the process of interaction anew. 
In addition, the international community has evolved in not only 
recognizing a duty under international law to prosecute international crimes 
as defined by international law, but also a responsibility to protect our 
populations from the very harms caused by atrocity crimes. 202 In addition to 
the obligation to give effect to criminal law recognized in the Rome Statute, 
the United Nations has recognized that primary protection falls to the state 
with secondary responsibility exercisable by the international community 
through the UN Security Council.203 This secondary right in the 
202. See Charity, supra note 28, at 90-109 (detailing the development and standards 
under the Responsibility to Protect). 
203. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 97, 'lf'lf 138-39. 
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international community to invest in state security even against national 
will is also exercisable through the Security Council, which can refer 
matters to the ICC, and delay the matter's consideration in the interest of 
international peace and security.204 
In the meantime, the progressive narrowing of the ICC jurisdiction 
has the potential to wreak immediate and problematic effects. For example, 
while the conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa may continue for 
years to come/05 actions surrounding the ICC have also given some 
evidence of compliance pull in the application of amnesty laws in 
U ganda?06 In communications with the ICC, Uganda was able to pass an 
amnesty law for the largest portion of those involved in regional conflict, 
while retaining the ICC as a reserve court?07 If that decision does not work 
to Uganda's benefit, the compliance pull for such an act will decrease, and 
the Court will not establish a norm in support of similar negotiations?08 In 
204. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 14 & 16. 
205. See, e.g., Jon Lunn, The African Great Lakes Region: An End to Conflict?, HousE 
OF COMMONS (Research Paper 06/51), at 4 (2006), available at http://www.stabilisationunit. 
gov.uk/stabilisation-and-conflict-resources/geographic/doc_ details/328-the-african-great-lakes-
region-an-end-to-conflict.html: 
The conflicts of the last decade across the African Great Lakes region must be 
understood in the context of longer-term dynamics of ethnic conflict and state 
formation. In doing so, it is particularly important to study patterns ofintervention in 
each other's affairs by the states of the region and the role of natural resources in 
fuelling conflict. Three factors have been identified by analysts as key contributors 
to conflict in the region: ethnicity, state failure and greed. Peace-building strategies 
have increasingly sought to address both political and economic issues and to 
incorporate regional and international dimensions. 
Even as political solutions move forward, it remains imperative to support the legal 
legitimacy of those solutions, as noted recently by Raphael Wakenge, Coordinator of the 
Congolese Initiative for Justice and Peace (ICJP): 
We need a new approach, a peace process based on the principles of justice. 
Past peace deals have often closed their eyes toward impunity, allowing war 
criminals to be integrated into the army, police and security services. This has 
undermined the legitimacy of the peace process and the reputation of the 
security services, including the judiciary. 
quoted in Richard Lee, Southern Africa: DRC Peace Deal Is Just the Start, OPEN SOCIETY 
INITIATIVE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA (Feb. 26, 2013), http://allafrica.com/stories/ 
20 1302260686.html. 
206. That is, there appears to be some quality in the law that may induce, but not 
necessarily compel, adherence (compliance) without necessarily reflecting obedience or 
recognition of a legal requirement in and of itself. For a more in depth discussion of theories 
of legitimacy and compliance pull, see Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538 (2002). 
207. See Uganda: Amnesty Act Without Amnesty, ALLAFRICA (June 3, 2012), 
http:/ /allafrica.com/stories/20 120604050 1.html. 
208. See KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 325 (noting that in addition to support for norm 
creation through a transnational/supranational dialogue, the negotiations recognize different 
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short, the crimes against humanity that may be occurring in the course of 
this conflict will go unpunished, and the lack of criminal liability will only 
embolden future perpetrators of atrocity crimes. 
A. Decoupling International and National Mechanisms for the Prevention 
ofHarms 
As there is a duality of international and national interest in the 
protection against atrocity crimes, there cannot be a clear demarcation 
between responsibilities for the prevention of these international harms, as 
the protection is one recognized by international law for the benefit of the 
individual. However, the proposed complementarity requires a demarcation 
between the opportunity for state jurisdiction and international jurisdiction 
in the punishment of these crimes. Although both the international and 
national communities have interests in the outcome and the protection of 
persons subject to these crimes, the outcome should not be determinative on 
the mechanisms used. 
B. International Purposes vs. National Purposes 
Looking at the question of the extent to which national courts served 
an international purpose, on the eve of the British election in October 1918, 
Lord Finlay, the Lord Chancellor, said to an Inter-Allied Parliamentary 
Committee: "Britain had 'two aims in this war. One of them was the 
punishment of those who could be proved guilty of outrages,' and 'the other 
was reparation for the wrongs that had been done.' Prosecution of 
'offenders would not be mere vengeance; it would be the vindication of 
international morality. '"209 
The question of control by the state apparatus of mechanisms to 
prevent the international crimes described in the Rome Treaty goes to the 
core of complementarity. As previously discussed, there exist numerous 
reasons that a local trial under the authority of a state with an interest in the 
outcome of the case would be preferable to an international trial. Only when 
the state exercising primary jurisdiction proves unable or unwilling to 
engage in genuine investigations or trials would the international tribunal 
levels of criminality and gravity in the International Criminal Law sphere, and allow Uganda 
a voice in managing some of the lower level perpetrators). In addition to support for norm 
creation through a transnational/supranational dialogue, the negotiations recognize different 
levels of criminality and gravity in the International Criminal Law sphere, and allows 
Uganda a voice in managing some of the lower level perpetrators. See also Ewald, supra 
note 43, at 396; Baylis, supra note 31, at 44 (arguing that the adoption of the Rome Statute 
in certain cases in the Democratic Republic of Congo "is not an isolated importation of 
international law by the domestic system ... [but is part of the] multiple, overlapping 
international-national interactions aimed at the more far-reaching goal of promoting post-
conflict justice by rebuilding the national justice system."). 
209. See Willis, supra note 144, at 53. 
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consider the admissibility of the case for international adjudication. 
In attempting to prevent international harms, the state, as an entity in 
itself with responsibilities to its constituents, and as a member of the 
international community with responsibilities to the constituents of that 
community, may have different resources, limitations, and strengths than 
those available to an entity such as the ICC. The state-level apparatus will 
more likely have a clearly differentiated system of a judiciary, legislature, 
and executive. 
All aspects of the state may have an interest in the outcome: some in 
responding to constituent concerns for vindication (perhaps as indicative of 
justice - i.e., the justice system will vindicate the rights of various classes 
of people), some in response to stability (either through prevention of 
escalation, or through maintenance of power structures that support the 
status quo within the state, or minimize individual needs or desires of 
various parties within the state), and some in application of their own 
authorities within the state (responsive executive desirous of recognition to 
a problem that a court cannot respond to with adequate alacrity)? 10 Some 
have argued that the international community attempts to replicate the 
governmental structures such that nothing immunizes the ICC from the 
concerns raised within a state structure.211 
210. The writings of Georges Scelle on the penneability of the do maine reservti responds 
to this. A counterargument to state access to protection for those threatened by atrocities is 
now, and has always been, the concept of a domaine reserve - the space in which the state 
can distance itself from the encroachment of the international community. When the 
international community comes together and relinquishes authorities previously within the 
power of individual states to accomplish an international or transnational aim, the 
community creates a supranational system. In order for the system to function, there must be 
an agreement that the participants will follow the rule oflaw as expressed by the community. 
The government of a state must often represent the state in its international dealings, creating 
a dual role: both representing the interests of the constituents of the state, and representing a 
participant in the joint undertaking in a transnational sphere. Some international 
undertakings allow for or, indeed, require the actions of entities within a state system. One 
such example is the complementarity envisioned by the ICC Statute -while the international 
community responds to issues of concern, it does so because the actions are violative of both 
the international interest in the shared undertaking, as well as the constituents' individual 
interests. Scelle argues against states, such as the United States, that has an overbroad 
reading of the domaine reserve. See Scelle, supra note 88. 
211. Scelle, supra note 88, at 358 ("Social functions must be fulfilled in international 
collectives just as in national collectives, or the phenomenon of solidarity would rapidly 
disaggregate and the social tie would founder." [il faut que les fonctions sociales soient 
remplies dans les collectivites internationales comme dans les collectivites internes, sans 
quoi le phenomene de solidarite desagregerait rapidement et le lien social pericliterait]). 
Scelle gives examples of the various branches of a state government acting with an 
international motive. 
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C. Why National Courts Must Act 
National courts were envisioned to be the primary actors in 
prosecuting international atrocity crimes and enforcing the growing global 
consensus that human rights norms must be protected and promoted. 
Although they are not currently fulfilling this role, their importance in 
establishing a strong framework of international criminal justice should not 
be understated. 
As discussed, the state is well-positioned to take on this role: the 
preparation for the ICC planned around the concept of a reserve court; the 
complementarity provisions recognize a much more robust and active 
international community acting through national courts; and national courts 
are in at least as good a position to express the will of the States Parties to 
the ICC Statute as the ICC itself, until such time as the ICC has clarified its 
interpretation of the interpretive issues surrounding the crimes within its 
jurisdiction. 
This is particularly true where there exists a gap between what the 
ICC purports to do, and what the Statute requires the member states to do in 
conjunction with the Court. The application of international criminal law 
has been, to a certain extent, a gap-filling exercise - allowing for us to 
recognize the imperfections in our protective processes, and to then better 
articulate standards and processes to close the gaps. However, there are 
times where the international community recognizes a gap that fails to 
protect a class originally considered for protection by legal process. 212 
Given the opportunity to protect that group, where parties do not reach an 
agreement on how to best do so, or whether it is in fact possible to do so, 
later arguments surrounding application and/or codification may lean 
towards implementing the gap as part of the law as accepted by states so as 
not to create new laws on which states have not agreed, or to expand on the 
laws recognized by states. 
The application of the gravity standard by the ICC is paradigmatic; in 
raising what appears only an issue of complementarity, the ICC takes a risk 
by allowing state practice to redefine how crimes are prosecuted (or note 
prosecuted) within the ICC system. As noted, in the case of Bosco 
Ntaganda, the ICC's controlling admissibility by refusing to hear cases 
involving serious crimes unless the alleged perpetrator is among those most 
responsible puts the onus on states parties to do the same - a cascading 
effect of impunity that is precisely the opposite of what the Rome Statute 
strived toward. 
212. The development of the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect resolutions by the 
U.N. General Assembly and Security Council is an example of recognition of the 
international role in filling that gap-filling function. See generally, Charity, supra note 28, at 
94. 
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If national courts apply International Criminal Law terms broadly, 
applying the terms as they understand the terms and wish them understood, 
it will serve to bolster the ICC as an institution and norm-setting body, 
since the ICC will then be in a better position to rely on the judgments made 
at various levels of responsibility, and to recognize an international harm, 
even when the ICC cannot or would not hear the case at an international 
level. 
CONCLUSION 
Within the realm of atrocity crimes, no answer will serve as a panacea 
for all humanity's ills. That does not mean that we should not continue 
working toward as many remedies as possible. The ICC, by design, requires 
input from various levels - from States Parties, to individuals seeking 
investigations by sending communications to the Office of the Prosecutor, 
to other entities seeking to resolve conflicts. 
Where the individual members of the international community rely on 
the Appellate Chamber to set rules for the gravity of a harm subject to 
remedy, or allow for decisions to be relayed between the International Law 
Commission, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the leaders of States, 
individuals will have no voice in the international planning that would 
protect so many from systematic or widespread violence. Only by 
redoubling our efforts - through our legislatures, through our executive, 
through our courts, and through ourselves - will the international 
community be able to respond to our needs. 
